A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health by Brennan, Hannah et al.
Yale Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 18 | Issue 1 Article 7
2017
A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing:
Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health
Hannah Brennan
Law Clerk to the Honorable Theodore McKee, Chief Judge, Third Circuit
Amy Kapczynski





Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and
Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hannah Brennan, Amy Kapczynski, Christine H. Monahan & Zain Rizvi, A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging
Government Patent Use for Health, 18 Yale J.L. & Tech (2017).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol18/iss1/7
A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing:
Leveraging Government Patent Use for
Health
Hannah Brennan,* Amy Kapczynski,** Christine H.
Monahan,*** and Zain Rizv****
18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 275 (2016)
High drug prices are creating serious health and fiscal
problems in the United States today. This reality is vividly
illustrated by recently approved medicines to treat Hepatitis C.
These new medicines can cure nearly everyone with this
potentially fatal infection and may even enable the elimination
of this disease. But the drugs' sticker price-close to $100,000-
has meant that very few patients who could benefit from them
can access them. This Article describes an approach, available
under existing law, to bring about transformative reductions in
the prices of these medicines, at least for federal programs and
possibly beyond. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, the U.S. government
can buy generic versions of these medicines at less than 1% of
their list price plus a reasonable royalty. This power has
received almost no academic attention, despite the fact that it is
regularly used by the government in other sectors, including
defense. Indeed, though it has now been forgotten, the federal
government relied on this provision numerous times to procure
cheaper generic drugs in the 1960s. We recover this history and
show how § 1498 can once again be used to increase access to
life-saving medicines, addressing several important interpretive
questions about the application of the provision along the way.
We also offer the first sustained efficiency defense of this
approach. This power, we show, can be analogized to the
eminent domain power over land and similarly justified as a
means to address hold out problems. We show that courts or
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and developed in the Global Health Justice Practicum at Yale Law School.
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agencies can fashion damages remedies that provide robust
returns to investment, and so protect dynamic incentives while
permitting radical improvements in static efficiency. Our
remedy involves some risk, as do all policy innovations. But the
status quo is so deeply dysfunctional-with millions of
Americans unable to benefit from medicines that could halt the
spread of a major disease-that the case for action is
overwhelming.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The soaring cost of pharmaceuticals is one of the most
pressing domestic policy issues in the United States today.
Nearly one-fifth of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is
spent on healthcare, and pharmaceuticals are a key
expenditure.1 In 2014, the United States spent a record $297.7
billion on pharmaceuticals, over 12% more than the previous
year.
2
The 2014 increase in prescription drug spending can be
attributed almost entirely to recently approved drugs that treat
the Hepatitis C virus (HCV).3 With list prices that approach
$100,000 for a twelve-week regimen,4 these new medicines
have brought the issue of drug pricing roaring to the fore in
policy debates. High drug prices are of enormous concern to
voters, 5 policymakers, and politicians across the political
spectrum.
6
High drug prices also have a significant impact on
health. The new HCV drugs offer an excellent example.
Potentially deadly if untreated, HCV is one of the most
I See Anne B. Martin et al., National Health Spending in 2014: Faster Growth
Driven by Coverage Expansion and Prescription Drug Spending, 35 HEALTH
AFF. 150, 152 ex. 2 (2016). See Hagop Kantarjian & S. Vincent Rajkumar,
Why Are Cancer Drugs So Expensive in the United States, and What Are the




4 See infra Part II.B. Some payors have received substantial discounts on these
list prices. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
5 For example, a 2015 poll found that three out of four Americans view drug
costs as unreasonable and support significant new measures to bring prices
down. Bianca DiJulio, Jamie Firth, & Mollyann Brodie, Kaiser Health
Tracking Poll: August 2015, KAISER FAMILYFOUND. (Aug. 20. 2015),
https: //perma. cc/9FEN-SELL.
6 See Hillary Clinton's Plan for Lowering Prescription Drug Costs, Hillary.com,
https://perma.cc/U9HY-4PBW (last visited June 11, 2016); Trump backs
Medicare negotiating drug prices, POLITICO, Jan. 25, 2016,
https://perma.cc/9MQ6-GVBT; Joseph Walker & Heather Haddon, Marco
Rubio Latest to Speak Out on Prescription Drug Prices, Wall St. J. (Oct. 19,
2015 8:05 P.M.), https://perma.cc/8UZ3-GLGW; Remarks of CMS Acting
Administrator Andy Slavitt at the HHS Pharmaceutical Forum: Innovation,
Access, Affordability and Better Health, Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs.
(Nov. 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/5KWU-P5ER; Peter Loftus, Bernie Sanders
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pressing health problems facing the United States.7 The new
drugs are far superior to previous treatments and could
potentially enable elimination of the disease.8 But treating all
of the approximately 5.2 million people who currently have
HCV in the United States at the best reported prices offered by
Gilead, the sole supplier of the most important new drugs,
would cost at least $234 billion. 9 Given the budget impact of
these new medicines, most payors have sharply restricted their
availability-covering them only for the very sickest, or
refusing to cover them at all 0-instead of rapidly rolling them
out. Medicaid, for example, treated only 2.4% of enrollees
estimated to have HCV in 2014, despite spending more than a
billion dollars on the new medicines.1 1 Even with the small
number treated, Gilead's earnings have been stratospheric: the
company earned $36 billion from its new HCV medicines in
their first twenty-seven months on the market. 12
Gilead's prices vastly exceed the cost of producing these
drugs. Generic versions of the treatments are on the market in
7 Erik Chak, Hepatitis C Virus Infection in USA: An Estimate of True
Prevalence, 31 LIVER INTL 1090, 1090, 1097 (2011), available at
https://perma.cc/97WG-3GQG.
8 Eradication is defined as the reduction of new disease cases to zero
worldwide. In this Article, we use elimination, which refers to the reduction
of new disease cases to zero in a particular country. Brian R. Edlin & Emily
R. Winkelstein, Can Hepatitis C be Eradicated in the United States?, 110
ANTIVIRAL RES. 79, 80 (2014).
9 As we describe below, the most important and widely prescribed of the new
HCV drugs are sofosbuvir-based regimes. Sofosbuvir (brand name Sovaldi) is
prescribed most commonly today as a combination drug called Harvoni
(generic name sofosbuvir and ledipasivir). See infra note 61. In this paper, we
often draw on evidence regarding the cost and availability of sofosbuvir alone
because this drug has been on the market longer than the combination drug
Harvoni and more evidence exists regarding sofosbuvir's pricing, research
and development (R&D) expenditures, and availability. For sofosbuvir,
Gilead has reported that it offers average discounts of 46%. Based on
information provided to Gilead's shareholders, analysts estimate that Gilead
is also offering such discounts on Harvoni, pricing it at about $45,000 per
course of treatment on average. See Ed Silverman, What the 'Shocking'
Gliead Discounts on its Hepatitis C Drugs Will Mean, WALL ST. J. PHARMALOT
BLOG (Feb. 4, 2015, 12:13 PM), https://perma.cc/NE7W-YI)28. Nevertheless,
many government payors do not have access to discounts this steep. See infra
note 76-88 and accompanying text. Assuming all payors had access to these
discounts, the drug would cost about $45,000 for a standard course of
treatment, and treatment of 5.2 million people would cost at least $234
billion. See Chak, supra note 7, at 1096. Note that this estimate is simplified:
it does not reflect the cost of healthcare delivery, and does not account for
disease transmission dynamics and new cases of the disease.
10 See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
11 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 114TH CONG., THE PRICE OF SOVALDI AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 82 (2015).
12 Press Release, Public Citizen, Gilead's Earnings Are Based on Price Gouging
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India for under $500 for a twelve-week course of treatment,
and estimates suggest that economies of scale could drive the
competitive price of production to less than a couple of hundred
dollars. 13 As we will describe, the full research and
development (R&D) cost of these drugs were likely in the
hundreds of millions of dollars-a sum that Gilead recouped
many times over in just its first year of sales. 14 The HCV
situation therefore raises, in urgent form, the problem that
economists have long identified with patent-based drug pricing:
the potential for massive social "deadweight" losses that stem
from supra-marginal cost pricing. 15
Is there a better way to approach HCV treatment and
compensation for innovation, one that does not inevitably lead
to rationing that dramatically limits the public health benefits
available from these new medicines? Most existing proposals to
significantly reduce drug prices require new legislation.16 This
Article instead identifies a legal remedy that has been hiding
in plain sight. Under existing law, the federal government can
purchase and distribute generic versions of patented
medicines.17 28 U.S.C. § 1498 permits the government to "use"
13 Andrew Hill et al., Rapid Reductions in Prices for Generic Sofosbuvir and
Daclatasvir to Treat Hepatitis C, 2 J. VIRUS ERADICATION 28, 30 (2016);
Generic Sofosbuvir and Ledipasvir Fixed-dose Combination Availability and
India Market pricing as of 26April 2016, HEPATITIS C IN ASIA (Apr. 25, 2016),
https://perma.cc/N3XP-3VDK.
14 See infra Part IV.D.
15 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees'Market Power
Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty
and Non Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1007-08 (1999); Michael
Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q. J.
ECON. 1137, 1140 (1998).
16 See Philip Rocco et al., How Much Does Congress Care About Drug Prices?
Less than it Should, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Jan. 13, 2016),
https://perma.cc/V729-QCRH (commenting that the majority of drug pricing
reform proposals would require congressional action despite a decline in
congressional attention to prescription drug spending over the past decade);
see also Kevin Outterson & Aaron S. Kesselheim, How Medicare Could Get
Better Prices on Prescription Drugs, 28 HEALTH AFF. w832, w833 (2009)
(listing common drug pricing reform proposals, all of which require
Congressional action).
17 In some ways, our proposal resembles the use of the federal government's
"march-in rights" under the Bayh Dole Act. 35 U.S.C. § 201(f) (2012). Some
members of Congress have encouraged use of these march-in rights to
"respond to the soaring cost of pharmaceuticals." Letter from Rep. Lloyd
Doggett, to Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. Burwell and Dir. of the Nat'l
Inst. of Health Collins (undated), https://perma.cc/U8RH-3WUF. In a similar
vein, the Center for American Progress recently recommended that the
government rely on march-in rights to use generics for drugs that are
excessively priced against benchmarks set by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services. TOPHER SPIRO, MAURA CALSYN & THOMAS HUELSKOETTER,
ENOUGH IS ENOUGH: THE TIME HAS COME TO ADDRESS SKY-HIGH DRUG PRICES,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 28 (Sept. 18, 2015), available at
2016 279
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patents at any time without permission of the patent holder, as
long as reasonable compensation is provided.18
This legal provision is rooted in the government's
sovereign immunity and is regularly used today, for example,
in the service of national defense. 19 Where medicines are
concerned, it has been invoked only once in recent years.
During the anthrax scare in 2001, the government threatened
to use § 1498 to buy a generic antibiotic and then quickly cut a
deal with the manufacturer for greatly reduced prices. 20
Although this provision has been largely forgotten, in the 1960s
and early 1970s, federal agencies relied on the statute to
procure generic medicines, and understood it as a critical tool
to curb drug prices.
21
With the pharmaceutical industry's prices reemerging
as a significant political issue today,22 § 1498 has begun to
receive renewed attention. Senator and presidential candidate
Bernie Sanders has proposed relying on the provision to treat
veterans in the government's care, and his proposal has
garnered some support from colleagues in the Senate.23 But to
https://perma.cc/884M-YQWK. These options, however, are limited to drugs
that have received significant federal funding. In contrast, our proposal can
be applied to any drug, irrespective of funding sources. Our proposal also
addresses issues stemming from the FDCA data exclusivity rules, see infra
Part V.B, which may present a barrier to exercising march-in authority.
Rachel Sachs, March-In Rights Alone Won't Solve Our Drug Pricing
Problems, BILL OF HEALTH (Jan. 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/HE43-R9X5.
18 The provision has been understood as a species of eminent domain, but is
more precisely characterized as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity with
respect to patent infringement. See infra notes 161-163 and accompanying
text. By its terms, patent holders may seek damages for, but not enjoin,
patent infringement. The provision also insulates private contractors who
supply the government. For more on the history of the statute, see infra Part
III.B.
19 See infra Part III.B.
20 See infra note 136 and accompanying text (describing the threat and Bayer's
voluntary response).
21 See infra notes 141-155.
22 See supra note 6.
23 Letter from U.S. Sen. Bernie Sanders to U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs Secy
Robert McDonald (May 12, 2015), available at https://perma.cc/GH8M-HADS;
see Sen. Richard Blumenthal, Remarks at Exploring the Implementation and
Future of the Veterans Choice Program, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Veterans'Aff , (May 12, 2015), available at http://www.c-
span.org/video/?325991-1/hearing-veterans-choice-program-implementation-
future ("Let me say that you will be asked shortly by Senator Sanders urging
that he uses authority to break patents on Hepatitis C medication for the
treatment of veterans. I strongly urge you consider using your authority to
take that action that will make this medication more widely available to
veterans."). Importantly, others in the policy space have begun to urge
recourse to § 1498 as well. See, e.g., James Love, KEI Policy Brief Non-
Voluntary use of HCVpatents in the United States, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY
INT'L, July 18, 2015, available at https://perma.cc/RNK4-WZPK; Hepatitis C
280
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date, the call has gone unheeded, and the possibility of relying
on § 1498 to lower drug prices has received almost no scholarly
attention.
24
This Article makes a twofold contribution: We offer the
first sustained theoretical defense of the government's § 1498
power, and show how this power can be leveraged to improve
both efficiency and health, while preserving long-term
incentives for research. Second, we show that this statute can
and should be used to remedy the national crisis surrounding
access to HCV drugs. Resolving several unexplored legal issues
regarding the scope of government patent use, we provide a
detailed explanation of how § 1498 can be used for federal
programs (including the Veterans Health Administration, the
Indian Health Service, Bureau of Prisons, Medicare, and
Medicaid), state correctional facilities, and perhaps beyond.
in Veterans Before the S. Comm. on Veterans'Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014)
(statement of Robert Weissman, President, Public Citizen).
24 The Cipro example prompted a few academic responses. See Amanda
Mitchell, Comment, Tamiflu, the Takings Clause, and Compulsory Licenses:
An Exploration of the Government's Options for Accessing Medical Patents, 95
CAL. L. REV. 535, 537 (2007); Daniel R. Cahoy, Patent Fences and
Constitutional Fence Posts: Property Barriers to Pharmaceutical Importation,
15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 623, 624-25 (2005); Daniel R.
Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side Effects of Cipro(r): A Reevaluation of
Compensation Rules for Government Takings of Patent Rights, 40 AM. Bus.
L.J. 125, 126-27 (2002); see also Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn,
Biomedical Patents and the Public's Health Is There a Role for Eminent
Domain?, 295 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 434, 435 (2006) (brief discussion targeting
the medical community). None of these, however, offer a robust economic
justification for use of § 1498 to address excessive drug pricing (as we do in
Parts III and IV), and they ignore several important legal issues critical to
the use of this power (which we address in Part V). There is a small literature
that looks at § 1498 more broadly, providing historical background and
summarizing case law under the statute. See, e.g., Sean M. O'Connor, Taking,
Tort, or Crown Right? The Confused Early History of Government Patent
Policy, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 145 (2012) (providing a thorough
review of the history of § 1498 and early suits against the government for
patent infringement); Matthew S. Bethards, Condemning a Patent: Taking
Intellectual Property by Eminent Domain, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 81, 88-105 (2004)
(surveying the avenues through which federal, state, and local governments
might employ eminent domain and offering a cursory discussion of its
possible merits); Lionel Marks Lavenue, Patent Infringement against the
United States and Government Contractors under 28 U.S. C. Section 1498 in
the United States Court of Federal Claims, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 389 (1994-
1995) (describing the history of patent infringement actions against the
United States, comparing § 1498 with more narrow statutes authorizing the
infringement of intellectual property rights; and discussing past litigation).
There is also a significant literature on the constitutional question of whether
intellectual property is a form of property subject to the Takings Clause. See,
e.g., Thomas Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the
Fifth Amendment?, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000). But this literature does
not seek to defend the government use approach as we do here, nor does it
analyze the legal process through which the government exercises that
sovereign authority.
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Under our approach, the U.S. government could treat all
patients with HCV at just 2% of what it would cost using
current best-reported prices. 25 Use of § 1498 could
fundamentally transform the government's approach to HCV,
saving the lives of thousands of Americans and improving the
lives of millions.
Generalizing from this, we argue that the federal
government should invoke § 1498 in cases such as HCV, where
there are significant social gains to be had from bringing
compensation in line with the risk-adjusted cost of developing a
drug. This approach will allow the government to import drugs
at the marginal cost of production (or "generic" prices), therein
maximizing social benefit. To make this mechanism work as a
matter of innovation policy, the government must pay patent
holders compensation adequate to protect R&D incentives.
Courts' approaches to setting reasonable compensation
(damages) under § 1498 should reflect the economic realities of
the pharmaceutical industry, and we offer both a theoretical
and a doctrinal approach that achieves this. Importantly,
courts need not make these calculations perfectly: even with a
sizeable margin of error, the social gains in these cases will
likely far exceed the possible losses. We also describe political
dynamics that can help constrain excessive use of this
government power. Companies, we show, can be expected to
price in the shadow of the government's authority, yielding
efficiency gains beyond the specific cases where the power is
used.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Part II describes the "drug-pricing trap" that American laws
and policies create when they mandate comprehensive drug
coverage on the one hand, and simultaneously demand strong
exclusive rights for pharmaceutical innovators on the other.
This Part also illuminates the scope of the current HCV crisis
as well as the expense, consequent rationing, and public health
potential of the new HCV medicines.
Part III offers a theoretical justification for our
approach, drawing on information economics and analogizing
to the eminent domain literature. It also describes the history
of § 1498, bringing to light little known details about previous
instances where this statute was used to address high drug
prices and procure generic medicines.
Part IV addresses the critical question of how
compensation should be set under § 1498. We construct an
approach that is not only consistent with the § 1498
jurisprudence, but also reflects the purposes of this statute and
patent law more broadly. Courts would begin by using the
25 See supra note 9 and infra Part IV.D.
282
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standard approach to reasonable compensation, establishing a
baseline reasonable royalty calculated as a percentage of the
generic drug price. If appropriate evidence is supplied by the
patentee, courts would then adjust this compensation award
upwards to account for the patentee's risk-adjusted R&D costs
and to ensure a reasonable profit. We use the HCV example to
show that our method could result in substantial
compensation-on the order of billions of dollars-therein
ensuring incentives to invest. The HCV example also
demonstrates that the power can be used to reduce
dramatically the overall cost of treatment, and so generate
enormous welfare benefits. Here, reasonable compensation
would be very modest, because the company has almost
certainly already recouped its risk-adjusted R&D costs many
times over. We also discuss when the government should
invoke this power and address potential objections to our
approach to setting compensation.
Part V resolves two key legal issues regarding § 1498
that arise in the pharmaceutical context. Section 1498 requires
any patent use under the statute to be "for the Government"
and "with the authorization or consent of the Government."
26
This Part first explores when a particular use of a generic drug
may be understood as "for the government" and with the
"authorization and consent" of the government. In addressing
this issue, we show that § 1498 can have broad effect even in
the United States' fragmented healthcare system. Second, we
consider the interaction between government patent use and
the drug regulatory system, describing the pathways that
would permit registration of generic medicines intended for
government use with the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).
Finally, Part VI describes how the government, in
practice, should use § 1498 to procure generic HCV
medications. We describe four possible intervention options.
The first three would extend generic access to the nearly 1.5
million Americans with HCV who currently receive care
through (1) federally run healthcare programs, including the
Veterans Health Administration, Indian Health Service, and
Federal Bureau of Prisons; (2) federally sponsored health
insurance programs-specifically, Medicare and Medicaid; and
(3) state correctional facilities. Collectively, these approaches
are viable under existing law and transformative in their
health effects. A fourth option, embracing the privately insured
and uninsured, is also possible but may require Congressional
action.
26 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
2016 283
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II. THE DRUG PRICING TRAP
A. Rising Drug Prices
Drug prices in the United States are among the highest
in the world and continue to rise. Since the late 1990s, the
average price of an annual course of cancer therapy has
increased from $10,000 to more than $100,000.27 Americans
pay 50 to 100% more for drugs than patients in other countries,
largely because other countries have adopted significant
measures to lower prices by implementing price controls and
leveraging government buying power.28 At a systems level, high
drug costs may lead to overstretched health budgets, rationing,
and failure to provide the best possible care. At an individual
level, these costs may lead to catastrophic expenditures,29 non-
adherence to treatment,30 and sickness.
31
These rising costs have little or nothing to do with the
cost of manufacturing pharmaceuticals. Rather, they result
from what we call the "drug-pricing trap." Our patent system,
bolstered in various ways by exclusivity offered via the drug
regulatory system, 32 typically ensures that companies
introducing new drugs enjoy a decade or more of market
exclusivity.3 3 This grant of monopoly allows the manufacturer
to charge any price that it believes the market will bear. Such
exclusivity has made pharmaceuticals one of the world's most
profitable industries,34 with profit margins for some companies
reaching an estimated 42%.35 Economists estimate that the
27 Hagop Kantarjian & S. Vincent Rajkumar, Why Are Cancer Drugs So
Expensive in the United States, and What Are the Solutions?, 90 MAYO CLINIC
PROC. 500, 500 (2015), available at https://perma.cc/G3ND-KR9A.
28 Id. at 502.
29 See SPIRO, CALSYN, & HUELSKOETTER, supra note 17, at 2.
30 See Haiden A. Huskamp et al., The Effect of Incentive-Based Formularies on
Prescription-Drug Utilization and Spending, 349 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2224,
2231 (2003).
31 See, e.g., Robin A. Cohen et al., Strategies Used by Adults to Reduce Their
Prescription Drug Costs 1 (NCHS Data Brief, No. 119, 2013), available at
https://perma.cc/SX2F-V8AL ("Some [prescription drug] cost-reduction
strategies used by adults have been associated with negative health
outcomes.").
32 See infra Part V.B; 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).
33 C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges,
and Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 330
(2012) (noting that the average protection for a branded drug is 12.2 years).
34 SPIRO, CALSYN, & HUELSKOETTER, supra note 17, at 7 ("On average, the
pharmaceutical sector has significantly higher annual net profit margins
than almost any other industry-more than double the average net profit
margin for Standard & Poor's, or S&P, 500 companies.").
35 Liyan Chen, Best of The Biggest: How Profitable Are The World's Largest
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average markup for patented drugs is nearly 400%.36 The case
of Lipitor, a cholesterol drug, is illustrative: the expiration of
its patents were projected to cut the price of the drug in half
within six months, leading to savings of over $4.5 billion by
2014.37 More generally, the FDA has found that introducing
generic competition can cause prices to fall to as little as 6 % of
the patent-protected price.
38
Competition within classes of drugs can put downward
pressure on the prices of patented medicines. But in many
instances there are no close substitutes for a given drug.
Additionally, an array of laws restricts the government's ability
to effectively leverage this approach. Healthcare payors are
often statutorily required to cover new drugs. For example,
state Medicaid programs must cover drugs offered by any
manufacturer that enters into a rebate agreement with the
federal government. 39 Medicare Part D Plans, as well as
private health insurance plans serving the individual and
small group markets, have more leeway, but they still must
cover a minimum number of drugs in each category and class.
40
Public programs and private payors receiving federal funds are
also subject to nondiscrimination requirements that may limit
their latitude to create restrictive formularies.41 Prisons, for
their part, have a constitutional mandate to provide inmates
with adequate healthcare. 42 While these requirements are
intended to help ensure individuals receive the care they need,
payors that must cover a drug, whether overpriced or not, have
little leverage to bring down prices.
Other federal laws further tie payors' hands. Most
controversially, the federal government is prohibited from
playing any role in negotiations between Medicare Part D
profitable -are-the-worlds-largest-companies/ ( howing profit margins of 42%).
In comparison, the highest profit margin in the second most profitable
industry-banking-was 29%.
36 Dean Baker, Financing Drug Research: What Are the Issues? 7 (Ctr. For Econ.
Res., Issue Br., Sept. 22, 2004), available at https://perma.cc/DUP5-KHRX.
31 Cynthia A. Jackevicius, Generic Atorvastatin and Health Care Costs, 366
NEW ENG. J. MED. 201, 201 (2012).
38 Generic Competition and Drug Prices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/MJ6E-RJUS (last visited Feb. 26, 2016).
39 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(a)(1) (2012).
40 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(G) (2012) (Medicare Part D Plans); 45 C.F.R. §
156.122(a) (2015) (private individual and small group market health plans).
41 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
disability with respect to any health program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance, any program or activity administered by an executive
agency, or any entity established under title I of the ACA).
42 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) ("deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction
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Plans and drug manufacturers.43 Additionally, federal antitrust
laws limit private insurers' ability to negotiate prices
collectively.44 Thus, as we discuss in greater depth in Part III,
the effects of competition between patented medicines and
price discrimination are necessarily incomplete.
More pointedly, a fundamental conflict between our
healthcare and industrial policies is emerging. Our healthcare
policy works to guarantee that those with insurance gain
access to effective new medicines. Our industrial policy
provides companies with expansive opportunities to obtain
patents and other forms of exclusivity. Against the background
of the healthcare assurance, this industrial policy enables
pharmaceutical companies to extract exorbitant rents in the
form of high drug prices. We now turn to the example of HCV,
which illuminates the problem and its profound human
consequences.
B. Narrowing Drug Access: The Case of Hepatitis C
HCV is a blood-borne virus that inflames the liver and
can cause fatal complications. In about 80% of cases, patients
develop cirrhosis, a chronic infection that can scar the liver and
impede its ability to perform vital functions, such as filtering
toxins. Left unchecked, the disease can lead to liver failure and
cancer. 45 HCV is also linked to heart disease, cognitive
impairment, and diabetes.
46
In the United States, as many as 5.2 million people
suffer from HCV. 47 The virus is among the most deadly
infectious diseases domestically: in 2014, HCV deaths reached
a record high of 19,659, more than the combined death toll of
sixty other infectious diseases tracked by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention. 48 Furthermore, reports
suggest available sources vastly underestimate the total
number of deaths actually attributable to HCV.49
HCV has hit adults born between 1945 and 1965 the
hardest. Many individuals in this age group contracted the
virus through blood transfusions, wartime exposure, and
43 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111(i) (2012).
44 Outterson & Kesselheim, supra note 16, at w838 (arguing for limited
antitrust waivers to allow joint negotiations by Part D plans).
45 A.A. Modi & T.J. Liang, Hepatitis C: A Clinical Review, 14 ORAL DISEASES 10,
10 (2008).
46 Patrice Cacoub et al., Extrahepatic Manifestations of Chronic Hepatitis C
Virus Infection, 46 DIGESTIVE & LIVER DISEASE S165, S165-73 (2014).
47 Chak, supra note 7, at 1096.
48 Lena H. Sun, Hepatitis C-Related Deaths hit Record High in U.S., CDC Says,
WASH. POST, May 4, 2016, https://perma.cc/HQ88-43WK.
49 Viral Hepatitis Statistics & Surveillance, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://perma.cc/8F5Q-D3EE (last visited June 3, 2016).
286
12
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 18 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol18/iss1/7
A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing
contaminated needle use that occurred before health officials
even knew the disease existed.50 HCV also disproportionately
affects marginalized populations, with the epidemic
"concentrated among people disadvantaged by poverty,
unemployment, homelessness, substance use, lack of health
insurance and access to health services, ethnic discrimination,
and the epidemic of incarceration." 51 Indeed, due at least in
part to recent increases in injection drug use, the estimated
annual number of new HCV cases grew from 16,500 to 30,500
from 2011 to 2014.52
HCV has been called the "silent epidemic" 53 because
patients can be asymptomatic for decades.54 Until recently,
there was little interest in screening for and treating the
disease. The only HCV treatments available required months
of extremely toxic weekly injections. These injections cured less
than half of people with the most common HCV genotype55 in
the United States and had side effects so intolerable that many
patients were forced to discontinue therapy.56 But in late 2013,
drug-makers introduced a new class of HCV medications with
the potential to radically change the course of the epidemic.
Sofosbuvir (brand-name Sovaldi) was the first in this new
50 Hepatitis C Testing for Anyone Born During 1945-1965: New CDC
Recommendations, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://perma.cc/GV4Q-G2WG (last visited Feb. 26, 2016); Baby Boomer
Veterans More at Risk for Hepatitis C, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF.,
https://perma.cc/3YV2-C6UJ (last visited Feb. 26, 2016).
51 Edlin & Winkelstein, supra note 8, at 85. HCV is also re-emerging as a
leading public health crisis among young adults who inject drugs,
particularly in the Appalachian region. Abby Goodnough, Costly to Treat,
Hepatitis C Gains Quietly in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2015, at A14,
https://perma.cc/KU95-HL79.
52 Viral Hepatitis Statistics & Surveillance, supra note 49.
53 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COMBATING THE SILENT
EPIDEMIC OF VIRAL HEPATITIS: 2014-2016 ACTION PLAN FOR THE PREVENTION,
CARE AND TREATMENT OF VIRAL HEPATITIS 3 (2014), available at
https://perma.cc/W9ZW-RR9N.
54 Stephen L. Chen & Timothy R. Morgan, The Natural History of Hepatitis C
Virus (HCV) Infection, 3 INTL J. MED. SCI. 47, 49 (2006) ("The progression to
cirrhosis is often clinically silent, and some patients are not known to have
hepatitis C until they present with the complications of end-stage liver
disease or HCC.").
55 The word "genotype" refers to the particular strain of the HCV virus that a
patient had contracted. There are six major HCV genotypes, and a patient's
particular strain can be determined with a simple blood test. Infection with
more than one genotype is rare. The effectiveness of different treatments
varies by genotype. Hepatitis C FAQs for Health Professionals, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://perma.cc/HV58-RFVF (last visited
Feb. 26, 2016).
56 See, e.g., M.P. Manns et al., Treating Viral Hepatitis C: Efficacy, Side Effects,
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class, known as direct-acting antivirals (DAAs).57 Described as
"miracle drugs" by the press,58 these oral-only treatments have
reported cure rates over 95% in clinical trials for the most
common genotype.59 They also lack the harsh side effects that
defined prior treatments.60
Sofosbuvir, typically prescribed in its combination form
of sofosbuvir and ledipasvir (brand-name Harvoni), remains
the most important and widely used of these drugs to date.6 1
Sofosbuvir-based regimes are popular because they are more
effective than the alternatives for most patients 62 and are
approved to treat more genotypes.6 3 They also minimize the
51 Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. FDA Approves Sovaldi for Chronic
Hepatitis C (Dec. 6, 2013), available at https://perma.cc/7DSN-4YWG.
58 See, e.g., Ronan Farrow, High Price Miracle Drug Treats Hepatitis C, MSNBC
(July 28, 2014), https://perma.cc/FSB4-SWQU.
59 Diana Gritsenko & Gregory Hughes, Ledipasvir/Sofosbuvir (Harvoni):
Improving Options for Hepatitis C Virus Infection, 40 PHARMACY &
THERAPEUTICS 256, 259 tbl.3 (2015).
60 Ara A. Kardashian & Paul J. Pockros, New Direct-Acting Antiviral Therapies
for Treatment of Chronic Hepatitis C Virus Infection, 11 GASTROENTEROLOGY
& HEPATOLOGY 458, 460 (2015).
61 HEALTH SECTOR TREND REPORT, ALTARUM INST. CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE HEALTH
SPENDING 1 (July 2015), available at https://perma.cc/4JPZ-2ZB5.
62 Different patients may respond to different HCV treatments. On the whole,
however, the sofosbuvir plus ledipasvir combination therapy has had the
highest cure rates across sub-types of the virus. Brian P. Lam et al., The
Changing Landscape of Hepatitis C Virus Therapy: Focus on Interferon-free
Treatment, 8 THERAPEUTIC ADV. IN GASTROENTEROLOGY 298, 304-307 (2015)
(listing cure rates by treatment across stages of disease, HCV genotype, and
prior treatment status); see also DRUG EVIDENCE REVIEW: ZEPATIER VS.
SOVALDI AND HARVONI, ADVERA HEALTH ANALYTICS, INC. (2016), available at
https://perma.cc/E2KD-F56E ("To summarize all the trials conducted in
varying designs, Harvoni seems to display a higher SVR rate (99%) in
[treatment naive] patients than Zepatier (95%) and Sovaldi (91%). Zepatier
and Harvoni appeared to have similar efficacy in treatment experienced
patients as standalone therapy. In HIV co-infected patients, Harvoni and
Zepatier may appear to have similar high SVR (96%) than Sovaldi (76%).").
63 The FDA has approved sofosbuvir for treatment of genotypes 1-4. Gilead
Announces Results from Studies Evaluating Sofosbuvir-Based Regimens in
Chronic Hepatitis C Patients with Genotypes 2-5, GILEAD (Apr. 25, 2015),
https://perma.cc/39BY-TB59. It has approved ledipasvir/sofosbuvir for
genotypes 1, 4, 5, and 6. U.S. FDA Approves New Indications for Harvoni®,
Gilead's Once-Daily Single Tablet Regimen for Chronic Hepatitis C, GILEAD
(Nov. 12, 2015 https://perma.cc/HU3W-NS5N. Merck's new medication,
grazoprevir/elbasvir, is only approved for genotypes 1 and 4. FDA Approves
Zepatier for Treatment of Chronic Hepatitis C Genotypes 1 and 4, FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 28, 2016), https://perma.cc/9J6E-LMM9. Viekira Pak is
only approved for genotype 1. FDA Approves Viekira Pak to Treat Hepatitis C,
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 19, 2014), https://perma.cc/DBE2-AK8M.
Technivie has been approved for genotype 4. FDA Approves Technivie for
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need for certain kinds of pre-treatment testing6 4 and offer a
one-pill-per-day regime. 65 A new sofosbuvir combination
therapy, composed of sofosbuvir and a drug called velpatasvir
(brand-name Epclusa), was approved in late June 2016 and
may become the sofosbuvir-regimen of choice.6 It has garnered
Breakthrough Therapy designation, which is granted only to
investigational medicines that may offer major advances in
treatment over existing options.6 7 This combination therapy
can be used to treat patients with all six genotypes,6 8 and a
recent study found that the cure rate among patients receiving
sofosbuvir/velpatasvir was 99%.69
These drugs offer the first meaningful opportunity to
not only treat HCV successfully in most people, but also
contemplate its elimination.70 However, most of these new HCV
medicines came onto the market with list prices close to
$100,000 for a standard course of treatment (Table 1).
64 Certain testing is recommended for patients with genotype la prior to
starting treatment with Merck's new drug. See MerckReceives FDA Approval of
Zepatier (Elbasvir and Grazoprevir) for the Treatment of Chronic Hepatitis C Vinrs
Genotype I or 41nfection in Adults Following Priority Review, Business Wire (Jan. 28,
2016), https://perma.cc/962L-58P2.
65 AbbVie's drugs are not one-pill-per day treatments. Press Release, U.S. Food
& Drug Admin., FDA Approves Viekira Pak to Treat Hepatitis C, Food &
Drug Admin. (Dec. 19, 2014), available at https://perma.cc/5B8P-PN2L; FDA
Approves Technivie for Treatment of Chronic Hepatitis C Genotype 4, FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (July 24, 2015). However, Merck's drug is a one-pill-per day
treatment. Zepatier: Frequently Asked Questions, PROJECT INFORM (Feb. 2.
2016), https://perma.cc/9TC4-CGPZ.
66 FDA Approves Epclusa for Treatment of Chronic Hepatitis C Virus Infection,
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 28, 2016) (approving Epclusa for use alone and in
combination with ribavirin based on the presence and stage of cirrhosis).
67 Gilead Announces U.S. FDA Priority Review Designation for
Sofosbuvir/Velpatasvir for Treatment of All Genotypes of Chronic Hepatitis C
Infection, GILEAD (Jan. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/ZH6S-NEYG.
68 Id.
69 Jordan J. Feld et al., Sofosbuvir and Velpatasvir for HCV Genotype 1, 2, 4, 5,
and 6Infection, 373 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 2599 (2015).
10 See Tarik Asselah & Patrick Marcellin, Direct Acting Antivirals for the
Treatment of Chronic Hepatitis C: One Pill a Day for Tomorrow, 32 LIVER
INT'L 88, 101 (2012). Elimination would also require a far stronger
commitment to screening people for the disease, as many people remain
unaware of their status. Nearly half of people with HCV in the United States
may not know they are infected. Maxine M. Denniston et al., Awareness of
Infection, Knowledge of Hepatitis C, and Medical Follow-up Among
Individuals Testing Positive for Hepatitis C: National Health and Nutrition
Examination Survey 2001-2008, 55 VIRAL HEPATITIS 1652, 1659 (2012).
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Table 1. New Direct Acting Antiviral (DAA) Therapies
for HCV
Gilead Sofosbuvir December $84,000
(brand-name Sovaldi)71  2013
Ledipasvir/Sofosbuvir October 2014 $94,500
(brand-name Harvoni)
7 2
Sofosbuvir/Velpatasvir June 2016 $74,760
(brand-name Epclusa)7 3





Ritonavir; Ribavirin July 2015 $76,653
(brand-name Technivie)
7 5
Merck Elbasvir-Grazoprevir January $54,60011
(brand-name Zepatier)7 6  2016
These high prices triggered a Senate investigation into
the price of sofosbuvir, the most important of these drugs,
which revealed that Gilead set its list price without reference
to R&D expenditures.78 Instead, the price reflected a complex
set of judgments made by the company about, for example, how
71 Hepatitis C Online: Sofosbuvir (Sovaldi), U. OF WASH., https://perma.cc/EF8A-
G5KH (last visited Feb. 26, 2015).
72 Hepatitis C Online: Ledipasvir-Sofosbuvir (Harvoni), U. OF WASH.,
https://perma.cc/S6LD-ZGLK (last visited Feb. 26, 2015).
73 Caroline Chen, Gilead's New Hepatitis C Drug Approved by FDA, Priced at
$74, 760, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 28, 2016), https://perma.cc/T7NA-F287.
14 Hepatitis C Online: Ombitasvir-Paritaprevir-Ritonavir and Dasabuvir
(Viekira Pak), U. OF WASH., https://perma.cc/3STG-9UWK (last visited Feb.
26, 2015).
15 Hepatitis C Online: Ombitasvir-Paritaprevir-Ritonavir (Technivie), U. OF
WASH., https://perma.cc/E7P3-3DPK (last visited Feb. 26, 2015).
76 Hepatitis C Online: Elbasvir-Grazoprevir (Zepatier), U. of Wash.,
https://perma.cc/JW68-WN7R (last visited Feb. 26, 2016).
77 The list price of Merck's HCV medication is significantly lower than the
others because Merck entered the market nearly two years after Gilead and
AbbVie. Merck's list price, therefore, likely reflects the discounted rates that
many purchasers are actually paying for Gilead and AbbVie's drugs.
78 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 11, at 29-30 (showing that Gilead
considered, in setting the launch price of the drug, not R&D costs, but, for
example, the risk of prescribing restrictions at different price points, "costs
for the existing standard of care for HCV treatment," and concerns about the
reaction of professional societies and Congress).
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many prescribing restrictions and how much political outcry
different price points would generate.
7 9
As competing regimens have come onto the market,
some payors have negotiated discounts for sofosbuvir. 80 In
February 2015, Gilead reported that it expected U.S. discounts
to average 46%.81 These reductions appear to be the result of
both automatic statutory rebates for some payors and payors'
efforts to reduce prices by playing manufacturers against one
another and offering concessions, such as preferred status or
reduced restrictions on access.82 However, many payors do not
receive discounts this substantial. Medicaid programs, for
example, are entitled to a statutory rebate of 23.1%.83 While
they are also permitted to negotiate supplemental rebates
directly with companies, only five states had received
additional discounts from Gilead in 2014.84 The vast majority of
states have been unwilling to accept Gilead's conditions, such
as demands for "unrestricted access to the drug."
85
Even at discounted prices, most of those who need the
drug are unable to access it. Payors continue to restrict access
significantly through prior authorization criteria lacking any
medical basis as well as through restrictive formularies.86 For
example, thirty-one of the forty-two state Medicaid programs
with known reimbursement criteria for sofosbuvir restricted
access to persons with advanced liver damage, while thirty-one
had some form of clinically unsupported sobriety restrictions.87
79 Id.
80 Andrew Pollack, Sales of Sovaldi, New Gilead Hepatitis C Drug, Soar to $10.3
Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2015), available at https://perma.cc/W9A3-S2QA.
81 Meg Tirrell, Pricing Wars Heat up Over Hepatitis C Drugs, CNBC (Feb. 4,
2015, 12:13 PM), https://perma.cc/DQ3P-YH22.
82 Robert Langreth, How Gilead Priced Its $20 Billion Blockbuster, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Dec. 10, 2015, 5:37 PM), https://perma.cc/455L-RT5U.
83 42 U.S.C § 1396r-8(c)(1)(B).
84 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 11, at 81.
85 Id. (quoting Letter from Darin J. Gordon and Thomas J. Betlach, National
Association of Medicaid Directors, to Congress 3 (Oct. 28, 2014)); see also id.
at 106 (detailing access obligations imposed by Gilead for Medicaid discount
offers that ranged from 6-10%).
86 Examining Hepatitis C Virus Treatment Access, CTR. FOR HEALTH LAW &
POL:Y INNOVATION 6 (2015), available at https://perma.cc/75Y6-FRK8; see also
Paul Barrett & Robert Langreth, Pharma Execs Don't Know Why Anyone Is
Upset by a $94,500 Miracle Cure, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 3, 2015, 4:40 PM),
https://perma.ce/S6CA-9AB8 ("More than two dozen state Medicaid programs
for low-income patients, as well as for-profit insurers such as Anthem, have
restricted coverage for Sovaldi to those with severe liver damage.").
87 Soumitri Barua et al., Restrictions for Medicaid Reimbursement of Sofosbuvir
for the Treatment of Hepatitis C Virus Infection in the United States Medicaid
Restrictions of Sofosbuvir for Hepatitis C, 163 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 215,
216-17 (2015). The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) released
a notice in November 2015 expressing concern that some state access
restrictions, including limiting treatment before patients displayed
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Providers may not always know what constitutes "enough"
liver damage to warrant treatment, but delaying treatment can
lead to severe, irreversible liver damage.88 Overall, Medicaid
treated only 2.4% of enrollees believed to have HCV with
sofosbuvir in 2014.89
Even with prescribing restrictions, payors still face
budgetary crises from the discounted prices of these medicines.
In Kentucky, for instance, treating just 861 people with HCV
cost $50 million-7% of the state's total Medicaid budget.90 The
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) treated 40% fewer patients
from 2013 to 2015, but increased its spending on HCV drugs
more than three-fold.91
Providing widespread access at current prices is simply
infeasible. While disputes over formularies and drug coverage
are not unknown in the United States, the HCV landscape
presents the most extreme modern example of an exceptionally
effective new drug-indeed, a cure-deliberately being rationed
solely because of its price. As a result of these practices, many
patients continue to suffer from preventable liver damage that
may reduce the quality and duration of their lives. Some of
them will also infect others, most frequently through injection
drug use and, to a lesser degree, through sexual and
community transmission.
92
Yet this need not be. A twelve-week course of sofosbuvir
costs only $483 in India93 and $900 in Bangladesh94; it can be
significant liver damage, may violate federal Medicaid law. The agency
encouraged states to review any restrictions for compliance, but it also
acknowledged that it shares states' concerns about the potential budgetary
impacts of expanded access to treatment. It encouraged states to negotiate
supplemental rebates with manufacturers and indicated it was exploring
whether the manufacturers would consider offering value-based purchasing
arrangements to states. Assuring Medicaid Beneficiaries Access to Hepatitis C
(HCV) Drugs, CTR. FOR MEDICAID & CHIP SERVS. 2 (2015),
https://perma.cc/8A9U-FW5M.
88 Lauren A. Beste & George N. Joannou, Prevalence and Treatment of Chronic
Hepatitis C Virus Infection in the US Department of Veterans Affairs, 37
EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 131, 141 (2015).
89 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 11, at 82.
90 Goodnough, supra note 51.
91 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 11, at 93, tbl.4.
92 HCV is primarily transmitted through exposures to infectious blood,
including injection drug use, blood and organ donation, needle stick injuries,
and birth to an HCV-infected mother. It also may be spread through sex and
sharing personal items that have been contaminated with infectious blood,
including household objects like toothbrushes and razors. Hepatitis C FAQs
for Health Professionals, upra note 55.
93 Hill, supra note 13, at 30. Medical tourism is an obvious possible response,
though Gilead has imposed prescribing restrictions aiming to prevent this
practice. See Ed Silverman, Gilead is Criticized for Restrictions on Generic
Hepatitis C Deal, WALL ST. J. PHARMALOT BLOG (Mar. 19, 2015, 1:39 PM),
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manufactured sustainably for as little as $200.95 Though they
are not yet approved in the United States,96 many of these
generic drugs are produced by FDA-approved manufacturers in
FDA-approved facilities. 97 If HCV treatment were available in
the United States at these prices, our national approach to the
disease could be transformed, with millions more quickly
treated, and tens of thousands of new infections averted.
The consequences of high-priced drugs, such as
sofosbuvir, are dire in health and human terms. But are they
an evil necessary to support the cost of innovation? Every
proposal to lower drug costs must consider not only the static
(short-term) impact on drug prices, but also the dynamic (long-
term) implications for innovation incentives. The appropriate
balance between the two is the core policy question in the drug
pricing debate. When we pay for medicines, we pay for not
merely their manufacture, but also the cost of their
development, including clinical trials to prove their safety and
efficacy in humans. Therefore, to justify competitive
government procurement of medicines, we must account for the
economic implications of such procurement as well as of
unconstrained monopoly pricing of drugs.
III. THE THEORETICAL CASE FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF
DRUG PATENTS
A. The Problem of Patent-Based Deadweight Loss
While public debate in this area focuses on high drug
prices, the central economic issue is the efficiency of the
https://perma.cc/TKC3-HQZG (reporting that "Gilead requires patients to
present national identification and residency papers").
94 Incepta Pharmaceuticals Launches Generic Version of Sovaldi, HCV
ADVOCATE AND NEWS PIPELINE BLOG (March 11, 2015),
https://perma.cc/7WEK-GPGA.
95 Hill, supra note 13, at 30.
96 For a discussion of the routes to FDA approval of these drugs, see infra Part
V. B.
91 See e.g., Press Release, Cipla, Cipla Announces the Launch of Generic Drug
Sofosbuvir in India under the Brand Name 'Hepcvir' (Mar. 25, 2015),
available at https://perma.ce/36YQ-6J9S. Government procurement of foreign
products is subject to the Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2501 et seq.,
which mandates that U.S. agencies may only acquire "US-made or designated
country end products." India is not listed as a designated country. See Off. of
Acquisition & Logistics, Trade Agreement Act Designated Countries, U.S.
DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., https://perma.cc/C8AN-CQ48 (last visited June 11,
2016). However, agencies can import products from non-designated countries
when they are not available otherwise (e.g., in the case of generic HCV
medications). 48 C.IF. R. §25.403(c).
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development and distribution of pharmaceuticals.98 The aim is
appropriate allocation of resources; in this case, it is the
appropriate allocation of investment in R&D and maximization
of the social gains generated by the resulting medicines.
There are clear reasons to think that our current drug
pricing system produces not merely high prices, but
inefficiently high prices. They flow directly from the core
insights of information economics. Information is a classic
public good: it is non-rival and difficult to exclude, with a
marginal cost of zero. In other words, once a scientific formula
has been developed, a novel written, or a drug compound
proven safe and effective, that information (conceptually
separate from the information-embedded good-here, the pill)
can be used an infinite number of times without being
reinvented. Accordingly, the efficient static price for that
information is zero. Anything more would inefficiently depress
uptake by imposing a price higher than marginal cost.
The conventional graph depicting the implications of
monopoly pricing in the context of information helps illustrate
the point. Marginal cost here is zero, represented by a
horizontal line. The monopolist has an incentive to charge the
monopoly price (PM), and reduce supply (to QM), if the profits of
Area A (which he gains) are larger than the profits in Area B
(which he loses). Critical to the efficiency case here are Areas
B, C and D, which at PM represent deadweight loss, enjoyed
neither by the patent holder nor the public. Lowering a
monopolist's prices (here, from PM to P') diminishes deadweight
loss. Even if P' exceeds marginal cost, reducing price
diminishes deadweight loss (here, to Area D, with Area B + C
as net social welfare gain). The size of welfare gains increases
substantially if we assume steep demand curves (i.e., low
elasticity of demand) and larger price reductions.





98 Efficiency in the legal literature is typically fined either in wealth-
maximizing or Kaldor-1 licks terms. William Fis er, Theories of Intellectual
Property, in NEW ESSAY IN THE LE 'AL AND POLITI THEORY OF PROPERTY
168, 169, 177 (Stephen . Munzer ed., 2001). The lat er is clearly more
defensible and the form of efficiency analysis we invoke here.
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The problem of deadweight loss redounds to R&D
allocations as well. Patents raise funds for research by
imposing narrow and very high taxes-often on the order of
several thousand percent. These taxes are almost certainly
sub-optimal.99
The distortions associated with deadweight loss can be
reduced by price discrimination. In the above, for example,
with perfect price discrimination each consumer would be
charged his or her willingness to pay, eliminating the
deadweight loss associated with Areas B, C and D. Perfect price
discrimination, however, is not expected, even in theory. 100
Imagine, for example, a drug company trying to find, and
impose, an individual price for each of the five million people in
the United States with HCV. Even absent the complexity of
third-party payors, approximating these prices would be
extraordinarily expensive. With HCV drugs, moreover, price
differences are based not on willingness to pay, but on other
factors, such as statutory rebates and the purchasing power
and legal constraints on different entities. Notably, prices are
often highest for those whose ability to pay is most
circumscribed, such as state correctional facilities.10 1
99 See, e.g., Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging
Innovation, 113 Q. J. ECON. 1137, 1140 (1998).
100 See Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information
Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2072 (2000) (arguing that because price
discriminators must, for example, determine the appropriate price and
prevent arbitrage, "[t]he product is never sold to each and every consumer at
his or her valuation, but is instead sold in categories the size of which is
determined by the costs of identifying and implementing price discrimination
for that group of consumers").
101 See Am. Ass'n for the Study of Liver Diseases & Infectious Diseases Soc. of
Am., Overview of Cost, Reimbursement, and Cost-Effectiveness Considerations
for Hepatitis C Treatment Regimens, HCV GUIDANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
TESTING, MANAGING, AND TREATING HEPATITIS C (Feb. 2016), available at
https://perma.ce/D5AZ-HJXD ("State prisons and jails are usually excluded
from Medicaid-related rebates and often do not have the negotiating leverage
of larger organizations and may end up paying higher prices than most other
organizations."). This is an appropriate moment to note just one of the
problematic assumptions that conventional efficiency reasoning adopts.
Prices are presumed to reflect "willingness" rather than "ability" to pay. In
practice, ability to pay is constrained, particularly for some, and prices will
not closely track social welfare where this is the case-as is surely true of
many in prison, for example. For more on this point, see Amy Kapczynski,
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Market substitutes can also diminish deadweight loss
(for example, by pushing price from PM toward P'). The size of
this effect depends on the degree of substitution. 102 As
described above, this form of competition has reduced the price
of new HCV drugs. But even the discounted prices are very
high and far exceed the marginal cost of production.1 3 This
likely reflects the fact that, as the Federal Trade Commission
has shown, the pharmaceutical industry displays oligopolistic
dynamics. 104 Some reasons for limited market competition
among new pharmaceuticals are legal: competition is impeded
by formulary restrictions and the third-party insurance that
pervades the pharmaceutical market. 105 Others are social:
elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals is estimated to be
very low. 106 Put another way, individuals are extremely
sensitive to even small differences in health outcomes, making
it difficult for medicines to be true market substitutes for one
another.107
Despite some price discrimination and competition
between medicines within a class, the problem of deadweight
loss in pharmaceuticals remains. Projections of the magnitude
vary, but invariably suggest that it is significant. Michael
Kremer, for example, estimates that the social value of new
medicines is 2.7 times greater than the profits that can be
extracted by a monopolist, if that monopolist cannot price
Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism,
59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 981-93 (2012).
102 See our discussion above of the reasons that there is imperfect substitution
across different HCV drugs, supra text accompanying notes 78-81. As Oren
Bracha and Talha Syed have shown, deadweight loss remains, even with
perfect substitutes, because price exceeds marginal cost. Oren Bracha &
Talha Syed, Beyond the Incentive-Access Paradigm? Product Differentiation &
Copyright Revisited, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 1841, 1852 n.31 (2014).
103 They also, as we will describe later, exceed the sum of marginal cost of
production and average costs of these drugs, i.e., factoring in estimated R&D
costs.
104 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY i (2002).
105 See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry Prices and Progress,
351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 927, 928 (2004) (describing several ways that U.S.
pharmaceutical markets depart from a competitive ideal).
106 Peter Siminski, The Price Elasticity of Demand for Pharmaceuticals Amongst
High-Income Older Australians: A Natural Experiment, 43 APPLIED ECON.
4835, 4844 (2011).
107 See generally Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, A Generic Entry and the
Pricing of Pharmaceuticals, 6 J. ECON. & MGMT STRATEGY 75 (1997) (detailing
consumer inelasticity of demand for pharmaceutical products); Henry
Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price Competition
in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J. OF LAW & ECON. 331 (1992)
(exploring the comparative "sales and prices of the pioneer and generic
products" for eighteen pharmaceuticals).
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discriminate. 108 Dean Baker, estimating deadweight loss a
decade ago by comparing patented drug prices with the
estimated marginal cost of such medicines, reached a figure of
$11 to $55 billion a year (depending on assumptions about
input and elasticity of demand). 109 As prices increase,
deadweight loss likely rises too. Consider HCV drugs: if we
assume an average patented price of $45,000 per course of
treatment and a production cost of $450, the associated
markup is 99%. Deadweight loss calculations easily reach
several billion dollars for this one class of drugs alone. Of
course, the losses as measured in human welfare created by the
restrictive pricing of HCV drugs are severe-particularly when
we compare the current scenario to the health gains associated
with the competitive pricing of these medicines.
HCV also illustrates the compounding effects of
externalities common in the health context. (Externalities are
costs that are difficult to price into a transaction, because they
are incurred by individuals who are not parties to the
transaction.) Treatment of communicable diseases often
produces major positive externalities.110 This is absolutely the
case with HCV: treatment eliminates the virus and so protects
others from infection. While the government can, in theory,
internalize these kinds of externalities, the political
constituency for widespread treatment is likely far smaller
than the attendant social benefit. " Furthermore, our
healthcare system often imposes a portion of the treatment cost
on individuals. Insurers often require patients to contribute
several thousand dollars in cost-sharing for HCV treatment,
when the drugs are covered.
112
108 Kremer, Patent Buyouts, supra note 15, at 1141. Kremer measures
deadweight loss in drugs from the perspective of diminished quantities
consumed, and using data from U.S. household income distribution and
assuming that willingness to pay for drugs is proportional to income. Id.
109 Dean Baker, Financing Drug Research: What Are the Issues?, Ctr. For Econ.
Res., Issue Br. 7 (Sept. 22, 2004), https://perma.cc/VSS3-P7HX; see also Ayres
& Klemperer, supra note 15, at 998-99, 1019; F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 450 (2d ed., 1980). For an
earlier estimate, based on slightly more complex methodology, see Guell et.
al, Allocative Efficiency in the Drug Industry, 73 MILBANK Q. 2, 219-20 (1995)
(estimating dead weight loss from $3 billion to $30 billion).
110 See David Woodward & Richard D. Smith, Global Public Goods and Health:
Concepts and Issues 8 (2015), WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://perma.ce/2Z9T-
2378 (last visited June 5. 2016).
111 This is the basic point of the public choice literature. See generally, MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
112 See, e.g., Jack Hoadley et al., Medicare Part D in its Ninth Year: The 2014
Marketplace and Key Trends, 2006-2014, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Aug. 18,
2014), https://perma.cc/8FAU-SMTQ (estimating that a one-month supply of
Sovaldi, which typically requires twelve weeks of treatment, may cost
Medicare enrollees more than $5,000).
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Harold Demsetz's classic defense of patents, despite
these accepted efficiency problems, suggests that patents are
more efficient than more direct forms of government funding.113
He urged skepticism about the quality of government
information and argued that patents provide a superior means
of guiding decisions about the allocation of inventive resources,
because markets and prices gather decentralized information
about costs and benefits. 114 In contemporary information
economics, patents' primary advantage over alternatives such
as government funded prizes and grants is thought to be their
reliance on markets to establish the value of the proposed
innovation.115 However, there are many ways to improve the
government's information about the value of new inventions.
Some of the most influential proposed reforms of our patent
system in recent years are novel means of guiding government
decision-making about which inventions to prioritize. For
example Michael Kremer has examined ex ante government
prizes (which rely on an auction mechanism) 116 and Aidan
Hollis and James Love have discussed linking compensation for
new drugs to their effects as measured in quality-adjusted life
years.117
These alternatives would require major legislative
change and would typically apply only prospectively, making
them of little help with respect to current bottlenecks such as
the one limiting HCV treatment. Solutions that use existing
law therefore have much to recommend them. They may take
effect far more quickly, and draw persuasive power from
existing experience.
We turn next to a short review of § 1498's history to
demonstrate its logic. We then explore the potential efficiencies
of our approach, drawing both on the recent wave of
information economics described above and the leading
efficiency defenses of the power of eminent domain in land.
B. A Brief History of § 1498
Until the turn of the twentieth century, patent holders
could not directly sue the U.S. government for patent
infringement because the federal government had not waived
113 See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L.
& ECON. 1, 11-12 (1969).
114 See id. at 11-13.
115 See id. at 7, 3.
116 See Kremer, Patent Buyout, supra note 15.
1 See James Love & Tim Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation in New Medicines and
Vaccines, 18 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 155, 159-60 (2009); Aidan Hollis, An
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its sovereign immunity in this area.118 In 1910, Congress chose
to provide patent holders with limited relief by partially
waiving the federal government's immunity for patent
infringement in a precursor to § 1498.119 This statute provided
patent holders with a forum in which they could seek
reasonable compensation, but not injunctive relief, for
government use of their patents.1 20 The House Committee on
Patents' Report accompanying the bill reveals that the law was
clearly understood not only to excuse inadvertent infringement,
but also to permit the government to intentionally infringe
patents to secure benefits for the public:
[T]he Government ought to have the right to
appropriate any invention necessary or
convenient for natural defense or for beneficent
public use, and that, too, without previous
arrangement or negotiation with the owner.
Nevertheless, the appropriation having been
made, it would seem that justice to the citizen
demands that in due time he should receive fair
compensation for his property. 121
118 See, e.g., Sean M. O'Connor, Taking, Tort, or Crown Right? The Confused
Early History of Government Patent Policy, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 145, 180-84 (2012) (describing the de facto immunity that the
government enjoyed until the 1910 version of § 1498 was adopted). The
Federal Court of Claims did entertain some patent suits premised on breach
of implied contract theories. But such claims had to be plausible, and not
merely an attempt to recover for patent infringement. See, e.g., Pitcher v.
United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 7, 11 (1863) (explaining that patentees may not
simply assert an implied contract cause of action where no plausible agent to
enter into the contract with existed). If a patent holder could not make a
viable implied contract claim, their sole remaining remedy was to petition
Congress for compensation. Supporters of the 1910 Act preceding § 1498
argued that this method was ineffective. Many claims would not make it out
of the Committee on Claims. See, e.g., 56 CONG. REC. 8758 (1910) (statement
of Rep. Graham) ("As a member of the Committee on Claims, I can state that
we have had a dozen applications requiring the Government to be honest to a
patentee. We have not passed out but a single one of those claims. We have
not time to investigate them. This bill simply allows the Court of Claims to
pass on the cases.").
119 Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851, 851.
120 Id.
121 H.R. Rep. No. 1288, at 2 (1910). This sentiment was repeated by supporters
of the bill when it reached the House floor. See, e.g., 56 CONG. REC. 8780
(1910) (statement of Rep. Dalzell) ("Now, I assume no one will contend that
the Government ought to be prohibited from appropriating to its use any
patent that it deems to be necessary, in the interest of the public service. This
bill will not interfere with the present system and practice so far as that is
concerned. It only proposes that where the Government, in the exercise of its
power and discretion, sees fit without making a contract with the patentee, to
use his patent, the patentee shall have the right to go into court and by due
process of law have his damages ascertained.").
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After the 1910 law was passed, government contractors
were unsure whether the federal government's cloak of
sovereign immunity protected them when they manufactured
patented goods for the government. The issue came to a head in
March 1918, less than one year after the United States
officially entered World War I. In a unanimous opinion, the
Supreme Court held that the 1910 law did not protect such
contractors.122 A few months later, at the behest of then-Acting
Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, the statute was
amended to clarify that contractors manufacturing infringing
goods on behalf of the government were also immune from
suit. 12
3
Two additional clarifications were adopted in 1942.
First, Congress explicitly expanded the scope of contactor
protection to cover subcontractors and others acting on behalf
of the government. 124 Second, Congress clarified that the
provision immunized third parties only when they were acting
"with the authorization or consent of the Government." The
aim was apparently to codify a federal district court opinion
that held that the government's immunity should not extend to
cases involving the "convenience" or "purposes" of a third party
contractor.1
25
The legislative history of the 1942 amendments also
reaffirms Congress's understanding that the federal
122 William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Bldg. Co. v. Int'l Curtis Marine
Turbine Co., 246 U.S. 28 (1918).
123 Act of July 1, 1918, ch. 113, 40 Stat. 704, 705 ("That whenever an invention
described in and covered by a patent of the United States shall hereafter be
used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the
owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same .... ") (changes
from Act of 1910 italicized). Roosevelt's support for the change is documented
in a letter to Senator Tillman read into the record of a hearing of the House
Committee on Naval Affairs on June 3, 1918. Committee on Naval Affairs
Serial No. 21, at 705 (1918). As the Supreme Court subsequently explained,
"[t]he intention and purpose of Congress in the act of 1918 was to stimulate
contractors to furnish what was needed for the war, without fear of becoming
liable themselves for infringements to inventors or the owners or assignees of
patents." Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 345
(1928).
124 Act of October 31, 1942, 77 P.L. 768 § 6, ch. 634, 56 Stat. 1013, 1014 ("[F]or
the purposes of the Act of June 25, 1910, as amended (40 Stat. 705; 85 U.S
8.CO. 68), the use or manufacture of an invention described in and covered by
a patent of the United States by a contractor, a subcontractor, or any person,
firm, or corporation for the Government and with the authorization or
consent of the Government, shall be construed as use or manufacture for the
United States."); John TeSelle, Authorization or Consent o Infringe Patents
in Production for the Government, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 583, 591-92 n.31
(1957-1958).
125 Act of October 31, 1942, 77 P.L. 768 § 6, ch. 634, 56 Stat. 1013, 1014; see also
TeSelle, supra note 124, at 589-92.
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government could invoke § 1498 to address excessive pricing.
Congress expressed acute concern over wartime price
gouging 126 and noted that the government could "use
unhesitatingly" any patent for which no license agreement
existed "by the simple expedient of expropriation and
infringement." 
127
Since 1942, the pertinent statutory language has
remained intact and was re-codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1498.128 It
reads:
Whenever an invention described in and covered
by a patent of the United States is used or
manufactured by or for the United States
without license of the owner thereof or lawful
right to use or manufacture the same, the
owner's remedy shall be by action against the
United States in the United States Court of
Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable
and entire compensation for such use and
manufacture.... For the purposes of this section,
the use or manufacture of an invention described
in and covered by a patent of the United States
by a contractor, a subcontractor, or any person,
firm, or corporation for the Government and with
the authorization or consent of the Government,
shall be construed as use or manufacture for the
United States.
129
The government may negotiate a license in the shadow
of its § 1498 power. Alternatively, the government may simply
make or purchase the patented invention, leaving the patent
holder to sue for damages if it is dissatisfied with the
126 See S. Rep. No. 1640, at 3-4 (1942); H.R. Rep. No. 2602, at 2-5 (1942).
127 S. Rep. No. 1640, at 2 (1942). Congress even adopted a special provision to
give department or agency heads the temporary power to adjust the amount
of royalties paid under existing licenses to a level determined to be "fair and
just, taking into account the conditions of wartime production." Act of
October 31, 1942, 77 P.L. 768 § 1, ch. 634, 56 Stat. 1013, 1013. This was a
reaction to what Congress saw as the hold-up problem created by wartime
demand: pre-wartime licenses were seen as imposing excessive payments
once war broke out because they contractually bound the government to
royalty rates calculated on the basis of far fewer units. S. Rep. No. 1640, at 3-
4 (1942).
128 Act of June 25, 1948, 80 P.L. 773, §1498, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 941. In 1949,
Congress revised § 1498 to remove changes in phraseology made by the 1948
recodification and conform the text to the original statute. Act of May 24,
1949, 81 P.L. 72, § 87, ch. 139. 63 Stat. 89, 102. In 1951, Congress transferred
the language added by the Act of October 31, 1942 to § 1498. Act of October
31, 1951, 82 P.L. 248, § 50(c), ch. 655, 65 Stat. 710, 727.
129 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2012).
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compensation offered. The present statute, like the 1910 Act,
provides the only remedy available to a patent holder is
reasonable and entire compensation; the patent holder may not
seek injunctive relief.
Though it receives little attention in the intellectual
property literature, the government today routinely relies on §
1498 to use or acquire patented inventions from non-patent
holders. Subjects range from electronic passports 130 to
genetically mutated mice. 131 In 2009, the Department of
Treasury used § 1498 to shield private banks from liability for
using software to help detect fraudulent checks.132 In another
case, the U.S. Army Corp. of Engineers used patented waste
removal methods to clean up hazardous waste.133 Over the past
decade, the National Institute of Health, National Gallery of
Art, National Park Service, and General Services
Administration have also utilized § 1498.134 Furthermore, the
government has invoked § 1498 not only when the patent
holder is unwilling or unable to negotiate a license with the
federal government and infringement is the only way for the
government to use the patented technology, but also when the
patent holder is willing and able to negotiate.
135
130 IRIS Corp. v. Japan Airlines Corp., 769 F.3d 1359, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
131 Letter from Francis S. Collins, Dir., Nat'l Insts. Of Health, to David Einhorn
House Counsel, The Jackson Library, Re: the Government's Authorization
and Consent to Practice Inventions Covered by U.S. Patents in the
Performance of Grants and Cooperative Agreements to The Jackson
Laboratory (June 17, 2011) (on file with authors).
132 Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 583 F.3d
1371, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
133 Sevenson Envt'l Servs., Inc. v. Shaw Envt'l, Inc., 477 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
134 Judgment Fund Payment Search, U.S. Department of Treasury,
https://perma.cc/B5WB-NP58 (last visited Feb. 25, 2016) (database listing
§ 1498 judgments issued against government agencies).
135 For example, in Leesona Corp. v. United States, the Marine Corps initially
issued a negotiated letter contract to Leesona for the production of the
particular batteries for which Leesona held the patent. However, the Marine
Corps subsequently withdrew the letter contract and proceeded with a
competitive bidding procedure, through which it awarded the contract to
Eagle Picher, Inc., the lowest bidder, rather than Leesona. Leesona Corp. v.
U.S., 599 F.2d 958, 963-64 (Ct. Cl. 1979). Overturning the trial court judge,
who had described the government's conduct as "despicable," id. at 966, the
Court of Claims commented that "[iun essence, and however clumsily [the
government] was attempting to break Leesona's patent monopoly in a
manner the law made permissible. The trial judge seemed to have difficulty
with the idea that the law accorded the United States rights not conferred on
private parties." Id. at 970; see also IRIS Corp. Berhard v. U.S., 82 Fed. Cl.
488, 490-91 (2008) (the government had purchased several electronic
passport readers produced by plaintiff for testing and limited operational use
abroad, but subsequently contracted with a third party to manufacture
electronic passport readers that allegedly infringed the plaintiffs patents for
domestic use); Wright v. U.S., 53 Fed. Cl. 466, 468-69 (2002) (government
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The sole recent use of § 1498 in the pharmaceutical
context was in 2001, when then-Secretary of Health and
Human Services (HHS) Tommy Thompson raised the
possibility of invoking § 1498 during the anthrax scare that
followed the September 1 1 th terrorist attack. Thompson's public
discussion of importing generic versions of the antibiotic
ciprofloxacin under § 1498 drove the relevant patent holder,
Bayer, to cut its prices by half.136 This example illustrates the
power of § 1498 in the pharmaceutical context: It provides the
government with the necessary leverage to obtain major price
reductions, whether through voluntary agreements or generic
procurement.
Though it has been largely forgotten, 137 there is also
precedent for the use of § 1498 to purchase generic versions of
patented medicines. The practice appears to have begun in the
wake of a 1958 opinion by the U.S. Comptroller General that
concluded that a supplier's possible patent infringement should
not be considered when selecting between competing proposals
for government procurement.1 38 A later decision affirmed that
turned down multiple production and licensing proposals from patent holder);
TVI Energy Corp. v. Blane, 806 F.2d 1057, 1058-59 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(infringing party was a competitor of patent holder for a government contract
to supply thermal targets to the military).
136 See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, supra note 24, at 435; Keith
Bradsher & Edmund L. Andrews, A Nation Challenged: Cipro; U.S. Says
Bayer Will Cut Cost of Its Anthrax Drug, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2001,
https://perma.cc/V2WC-UH88; Shankar Vedantam & Terence Chea, Drug
Firm Plays Defense in Anthrax Scare, Washington Post, Oct. 21, 2001,
https://perma.cc/YT6K-GW52.
137 See, e.g., President's Fiscal Year 1992 Budget Proposals: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Finance, 102nd Cong. 23 (1991) (Sen. Pryor commenting to then-
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, Louis W.
Sullivan, that "we have never used it [§ 1498], to my knowledge, in
pharmaceutical or drug patents."); Memorandum from Am. Law Div., Cong.
Research Serv., to John Monahan, Senate Special Comm. on Aging 4 (July
13, 1989) reprinted in MAJ. STAFF OF S. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 101ST
CONG., PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES: ARE WE GETTING OUR MONEY S WORTH
app. M, at 42 (Comm. Print 1989) ("it does not appear that there has been a
case involving the government's 'taking' of a pharmaceutical patent"). But see
Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the
Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 853, 868 (2003) (stating that "[i]n the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S.
government made and used tetracycline and meprobamate for the military
without permission from patent holders." (footnotes omitted)); Lars Noah,
Triage in the Nation's Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling Scarcity of Vaccines
and Other Drugs, S.C. L. REV. 741, 768 n.131 (2003) (noting that before the
anthrax scare, "[t]he government previously has used this power to procure
certain needed drugs such as the antibiotic tetracycline from sources other
than the patent holder or its licensees").
138 Op. of the Comptroller Gen. of the United States, 119 U.S.P.Q. 187 (Comp.
Gen.), at *2 (1958) (citing the government's overriding interest in
competition, and concluding that it "is not consistent with any duty on the
part of a contracting agency of the Government to protect the interests of
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this rule applies even in instances where the unlicensed
supplier has no obligation to indemnify the government.139 As
of the mid-1960s, then, the firm rule had become that "every
federal department and agency refuses to consider the possible
infringement liability of the Government in evaluating bids or
proposals in the procurement of patented items."
140
This rule was quickly applied to patented
pharmaceuticals, with multiple federal agencies deliberately
"purchas[ing] certain drug products covered by U.S. product
and process patents, from unlicensed sources for use in the
United States in deliberate violation of these patents." 141
According to industry representatives, the justification was
largely that "the prices quoted by suppliers of infringing dosage
forms are often lower than those quoted by the U.S. patent
owners and their licensees."142 In the most prominent case, the
Defense Department negotiated to purchase an antibiotic,
tetracycline hydrochloride, from an Italian supplier instead of
from the U.S.-based, patent-holding company, Pfizer, because
the Italian drugs were 72% cheaper. 143 (Italy did not issue
patentees or licensees with respect to articles which it proposes to purchase,
since the statute itself defines and provides an exclusive remedy for
enforcement of the patentee's rights as to the Government"). This reversed an
earlier decision finding that bidders for government contracts should be
required to show a legal right to produce the goods in question. See
Comptroller Gen. McCarl to the Sec'y of Commerce, 13 Comp. Gen. 173, 176
(1933). The patent-holder challenged the decision in federal district court,
arguing that the Defense Department could not rely on § 1498 unless it had
no possibility of supply at a reasonable price from a licensed manufacturer,
but the case was dismissed. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Robert F. Allnutt,
Patent Infringement in Government Procurement: A Remedy Without a Right,
42 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 5, 10 n.31 (1966) (citing F.T. Roberts v. United
States, Civil No. 1876-58 (D.D.C. 1958)).
139 Globe Indus., Inc., B-148135, 133 U.S.P.Q. 496 (Comp.Gen.), (1962).
140 See Mossinghoff & Allnutt, supra note 138, at 12.
141 Patent Infringement: Hearing on S. 1047 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, & Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 15
(1965). The practice was apparently used particularly frequently in the
Defense Department and Veterans Administration. Id. at 28, 40.
142 Id. at 16; see also id. at 23 ("The Federal Government has said that it has
adopted this practice recognizing the validity of the patents involved, simply
because it feels that it is saving money which really means in the case of the
procuring agency that it is doing nothing more largely speaking than saving
its own appropriations to the extent that it can buy the infringing drugs at a
lesser price than the lawful drugs, and it is inevitable that that can be done.
It is inevitable."); U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Office of the Sec'y,
Task Force on Prescription Drugs, The Drug Makers and The Drug
Distributors 41 (1968) ("The Defense Supply Agency (DSA) of the Department
of Defense, for example, has found it necessary at times to purchase patented
prescription drugs from unlicensed domestic or foreign manufacturers
because the domestic patent holder's prices (and those of his licensees) were
considered too high.").
143 Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc., B-141459, 119 U.S.P.Q. 187 (Comp. Gen.), at *1
(1960); see Mossinghoff & Allnutt, supra note 138, at 11 n.33.
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patents on drugs at the time.)144 The procurement was upheld
by the Comptroller General, despite the fact that no indemnity
was required by the Italian company145 and that Pfizer was
ready and willing to fully supply the government's needs for
"considerably" less than it sold the drug in the private
market.146
In the wake of the Pfizer decision, the patent-based
drug industry lobbied strenuously against the practice and
sought an amendment to limit § 1498 to instances where
"national security" required it.147 The Comptroller General and
representatives of agencies argued emphatically against the
change. They noted that the amendment would impose the
burden of evaluating claims of patent infringement on
agencies. They also argued that such an amendment would
"forgo one of the valuable powers which the Government has to
assure fair prices," and to remedy "exorbitant pricing" where it
was present. 148 Ultimately, the industry's entreaties were
rejected, and § 1498's language remains identical to that
enacted in 1942.149 The rule set by the 1958 Comptroller
General opinion also remains in effect.150
Federal agencies continued to procure generic drugs at
steep discounts throughout the 1960s. According to one source,
the Department of Defense's Military Medical Supply Agency
relied on § 1498 to procure approximately fifty drugs in one
three-year period, producing savings of $21 million. 151 In one
144 Id.
145 Id. (citing Globe Indus., Inc., B-148135, 133 U.S.P.Q. 496 (Comp. Gen.), at
*40 (1962)).
146 Forum, 4 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY. J. RES. & ED. 249, 251 (1960).
Interestingly, Pfizer noted that these lower prices "still reflect the cost of
research and labor in this country." Id. (emphasis in original).
147 S. 1047, 89th Cong. (1965).
148 Patent Infringement: Hearing on S. 1047 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, & Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 70
(1965); see also id. at 2-3 (statement of Robert E. Giles, Comptroller Gen.)
(arguing that "no Federal agency should be prevented by the patent statutes
from carrying out any program beneficial to the public at reasonable
compensation to the patent owner").
149 The patent-based drug industry was able to secure a minor victory in 1961,
however, when the House of Representatives adopted an amendment o what
would become the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibiting foreign aid
funds from being expended on drug or pharmaceutical products
manufactured outside of the United States if the manufacture of such product
would involve the unauthorized use of an invention covered by a valid patent
in the United States. See 107 CONG. REC. 16,284 (1961); see also 22 U.S.C. §
2356(c) (2012).
150 See, e.g., Hutchinson Indus. Inc. v. Accuride Corp., No. 09-1489 (FLW), 2010
WL 1379720, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2010), dismissed, 449 F. App'x 26 (Fed.
Cir. 2010); TVI Energy Corp. v. Blane, 806 F.2d 1057, 1060 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
151 MILTON SILVERMAN & PHILP R. LEE, PILLS, PROFITS, AND POLITICS 187 (1974).
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instance, the federal government procured the drug
nitrofurantoin from generic sources for nearly four times less
than the patent holder's price.
152
Because these cases tended to settle rather than go to
judgment, no case law regarding compensation in this context
was created.153 But practices under the law are instructive of
the parties' understandings. Hearing testimony suggests that
the parties typically agreed to a reasonable and apparently
modest royalty, rather than a measure of lost profits. In the
nitrofurantoin settlement, for example, the government agreed
to pay a royalty set at 2% of the patented price.154 Patentees
presumably concluded that little more would have come from
pressing the case to judgment, or wanted to avoid setting clear
judicial precedent regarding royalties, which in turn might
invite more government use.
Use of § 1498 appears to have tailed off in the 1970s,
but the reason for this decline in use is unclear. 155 When
152 Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings on Present Status of
Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry Before the Subcomm. on
Monopoly of the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 92nd Cong. 8,015 (1971).
153 Id. at 8,016 ("There is no decision of the Court of Claims with respect to the
purchase of foreign drugs or the purchase of drugs: of a foreign country.").
The only exception we identified occurred subsequent o this statement. In
this instance, however, the Court of Claims dismissed the patent-holder's
petition for compensation after the patent at issue was found invalid in a
separate action. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 496 F.2d 535 (Ct.
Cl. 1974).
154 Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings on Present Status of
Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry Before the Subcomm. on
Monopoly of the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 92nd Cong. 8,015 (1971).
155 In 1971, the Comptroller General Elmer Staats reported that "neither the
Veterans' Administration nor the Defense Personnel Support Center [were]
currently making extensive use of foreign sources for their drug
procurements." Id. at 8024. According to Comptroller General Staats,
between 1968 and 1970, the Defense Personnel Support Center educed the
number of foreign procured drugs from five to one. The Veterans
Administration had also stopped soliciting foreign bids. Id. We have not
found evidence of generic procurement in reliance on § 1498 since the 1970s.
The last instance we found comes from the late 1970s when Zenith
Laboratories, Inc. invoked § 1498 as an affirmative defense in a suit brought
by Hoffman-La Roche Inc. Zenith had filed a new drug application with the
FDA seeking approval to supply the government with generic diazepam
under § 1498. See Answer, Counterclaim and Demand for Jury, Hoffman-La
Roche Inc. v. Zenith Labs., Inc., No. 75-2221, at 3-4 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 1976)
reprinted in Innovation & Patent Law Reform, Hearings on H.R. 3285, H.R.
3286, and H.R. 3605Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the
Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 958-59 (1984).
The parties agreed to a consent judgment before reaching the merits of
Zenith's claims, however. See Consent Judgment, Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v.
Zenith Laboratories, Inc., No. 75-2221, at 6 (D.N.J. Aug. 2, 1979) reprinted in
Innovation & Patent Law Reform, Hearings on H.R. 3285, H.R. 3286, and
H.R. 3605 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 981h Cong. 970 (1984) (providing
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pressed in a 1971 Congressional hearing about the possibility
of using § 1498 more often, the Comptroller General cited
concerns about the uncertainty of damage awards.156 However,
agencies had for years made use of § 1498 without the comfort
of clear case law. We suspect the shift had more to do with new
drug regulatory practices and expectations,157 changes in the
political tides (for example, from the Johnson to Nixon
administration), and the rise in "propertarian" thinking about
intellectual property in the 1970s and 1980s.158
If this is so, then the recent criticisms of propertarian
thinking in IP,159 combined with the profound national concern
about high drug prices, 160 make this an opportune time to
reengage the potential of § 1498. Its renewed use, however, will
require concerted attention to appropriate royalty calculations,
and to drug regulatory barriers, issues to which we now turn.
IV. THE EMINENT DOMAIN ANALOGY & DAMAGES UNDER
§ 1498
"[t]hat nothing herein shall be construed as limiting, expanding or otherwise
affecting any applicability of Title 28, United States Code, Section 1498(a), to
Zenith's past or future activities").
156 At the 1971 hearing, Comptroller General Staats noted that one factor for
this was the threat of exposure to suit. Competitive Problems in the Drug
Industry: Hearings on Present Status of Competition in the Pharmaceutical
Industry Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select Comm. on Small
Bus., 92nd Cong. 8,024 (1971). As another official explained earlier in the
hearing, the purchasing agency cannot know in advance how much, if
anything, it will save if it relies on § 1498 to procure a good and cannot reach
a settlement with the patent holder. Id. at 8,014. This is not unique to
pharmaceuticals, however.
157 When questioned by a member of Congress about why the Veterans
Administration was not consistently procuring cheaper drugs from overseas
in 1970, for example, an official cited concerns about quality control.
Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings on Present Status of
Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry Before the Subcomm. on
Monopoly of the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 91st Cong. 7476 (1970). This
may, in turn, reflect changes in drug regulatory law introduced by the 1962
Kefauver-Harris amendments. These amendments created new complexities
for the registration of generic drugs. See PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A.
MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
996-1000 (2014). After the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act, generic companies also
have to certify that their products do not infringe a U.S. patent before they
can be registered. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A).
158 By propertarian we mean the view that intellectual property is-and ought to
be treated as-a form of property, and subject to property rather than
liability rules. This trend is often thought to have begun in the 1970s and
dramatically accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s. See Mark Lemley, Property,
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2005)
(describing the trend, and providing evidence via increased use of the use of
the term "intellectual property").
159 For just one leading example, see Lemley, supra note 158.
160 See supra notes 5-6.
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The government patent use statute has often been
referred to as an example of the "eminent domain" power as
applied to the patent context.16 1 As the preceding paragraphs
show, it can more precisely be described as a suspension of the
government's sovereign immunity.16 2 Importantly, courts have
repeatedly affirmed that government patent use is not subject
to the U.S. Constitution's Takings Clause. 163 Patent holders
161 See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
opinion vacated on other grounds reh'g en banc, 672 F. 3d 1309 (Fed. Cir.
2012); Leesona, 599 F.2d at 966.
162 H.R. Rep. No. 1288, at 2 (1910) ("The United States can not be sued except
where it has consented thereto by statute, and unless this or some similar bill
shall be passed the owners of patents will continue to be the only persons
who are outside the protection of the fifth amendment to the
Constitution..."). In this sense, it parallels recent cases asserting state
sovereign immunity to patent infringement suits. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). In Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Saving Bank, the
Court effectively held that the States are immune to patent infringement
suits under federal law. Presumably, if the absolute immunity for state actors
causes no takings problems, neither would the partial immunity expressed in
§ 1498.
163 See Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 172 (1894) (rejecting a claim
for compensation for patent infringement against the federal government as
a claim in tort, rather than a claim with a constitutional basis under the
Takings Clause); see also Zoltek, at 1351-53 ("As the Supreme Court has
clearly recognized when considering Fifth Amendment taking allegations,
'property interests ... are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law.' Here, the patent
rights are a creature of federal law .... Congress provided a specific
sovereign immunity waiver for a patentee to recover for infringement by the
government. Had Congress intended to clarify the dimensions of the patent
rights as property interests under the Fifth Amendment, there would have
been no need for the new and limited sovereign immunity waiver." (quoting
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984))). Some suggest that
Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015), "left no doubt"
that "patents are subject to the Takings Clause." Gregory Dolin & Irina D.
Manta, Taking Patents, 73 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 719, 775 (2016). But Horne
simply recited the dicta of an earlier Supreme Court case, James v. Campbell,
104 U.S. 356 (1882), that concluded that patent holders had no effective
remedies against the government. That point was affirmed and taken further
in Schillinger, supra, in which the Court held that government use is not a
Fifth Amendment taking. While existing case law does not clearly establish
that "patents can never be subject to takings," it does establish that
government patent use does not generate a constitutionally cognizable
taking. See Camilla A. Hrdy & Ben Picozzi, The AIA Is Not a Taking: A
Response to Dolin & Manta, 72 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 472, 476 (2016).
Even those who argue that some government interventions related to patents
should be subject to the Takings Clause treat § 1498's requirement of
"reasonable and entire compensation" as satisfying the clause's requirements.
See, e.g. DAVID A. DANA & TiOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY TAKINGS 238 n.373
(2002). Dana and Merrill discuss the baseline for compensation we adopt
here-risk-adjusted R&D-as one of the two most plausible baselines for a
takings analysis in this context. Id. at 244-45. But they prefer an approach
308
34
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 18 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol18/iss1/7
A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing
have never had a right to prevent government use, and so in
this respect have never enjoyed property to be taken. The
analogy of eminent domain is nonetheless a powerful one,
because the economic justification for § 1498 parallels the case
for a government power of eminent domain in important ways.
The economic case for eminent domain in land is well
understood: market exchanges suffer transaction costs, and
when these costs are high, they can preclude exchanges that
would result in net social gain.16 4 The classic example involves
a hold-out to a new railroad project, where the last property-
holder whose land is needed for a new railroad line can demand
a price that would extract the full social value of the railroad,
leading to bargaining breakdown. 165 This problem is also
sometimes described as one of monopoly. Where the
government undertakes this kind of public works project,
each owner is a monopolist, effectively
dominating a resource needed to complete the
project. Each owner can thereby engage in
monopoly pricing, that is, can set his price well
above the opportunity cost of the needed
resource. The result: fewer oil pipelines will be
constructed, and those few that are built will cost
a higher than optimal price.166
When a pharmaceutical company holds a key patent on
a drug, it generates a similar kind of problem. The company
knows that government programs, with their commitment to
cover lifesaving medicines, must be "routed" through its
intellectual property. It may then demand prices that far
exceed its investment, appropriate maximum social welfare to
itself, and limit the welfare potential of its inventions.
Government insurance programs, as intimated above,
exacerbate deadweight loss from patents: because it "makes
patient demand highly price-inelastic, insurance creates the
potential and incentives for manufacturer prices that exceed
keyed more closely to expected profits due to the risk of error within agencies
and courts, id. at 246-47. Our proposed approach addresses both limitations,
by accounting for risk of error and awarding a premium to ensure supra-
competitive profits. See infra Part IVA.
164 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rule,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1106
(1972).
165 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 62-63 (2002).
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the level that would result from patents alone." 167 Yet the
government's power of eminent domain is essential where
private property rights prevent the government from realizing
the key function of providing public goods.168 Our case merely
extends the analysis from one kind of hold-out problem (the
bilateral monopoly enjoyed by the last homeowner) to
another-the pricing premium a patent holder enjoys when
exclusive rights translate into pricing that exceeds marginal
cost, or even marginal cost plus average cost.
In the land context, we treat a price akin to the private
market price as an efficient one, assuming that land is
relatively fungible as a commodity and markets are thus
reasonably competitive. 169 However, the pharmaceutical
context is more complex. "Market" prices here are set against
the backdrop of exclusive rights, meaning that market prices
may also be-indeed, almost certainly are-set inefficiently
high.1 70 This is the implication of the theoretical discussion and
the deadweight loss estimates described above. Where
medicines are concerned, the question of appropriate valuation,
and thus appropriate royalties under § 1498, is critical. We
therefore return to the discussion of information economics
begun above.
A. Establishing Royalty Rates for Government Use of
Patents
The key challenge for the appropriate use of § 1498 is
compensation, i.e., damages or royalties. Patentees are entitled
to "reasonable and entire compensation" under the statute.1
71 If
royalties are set too low, use of the power will result in too little
research in the private sector.172 If royalties are set too high,
167 See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon, Adrian K. Towse, & Jorge Mestre-Ferrandiz,
Value-Based Differential Pricing: Efficient Prices for Drugs in a Global
Context, at 2 (Nat'l. Bureau Econ. Res. Working Paper, No. 18593, Dec. 2012),
https://perma.cc/Z9Y7-BHFA.
168 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 165, at 61.
169 A more substantial puzzle centers on why the government is allowed to use
eminent domain in land in settings where strategic bargaining is less of a
concern. If one landowner tries to hold out against an attempt to site a post
office, for example, there will be many other appropriate plots. Absent
collusion, the government should be able to procure land at market rates. See
e.g. Merrill, supra note 166, at 76-78 (arguing that the case for eminent
domain is weaker where there are "thicker" markets).
170 See generally DANA & MERRILL, supra note 163, at 234-47.
171 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). The text differs than that of the Patent Act, which
requires "adequate" compensation. 35. U.S.C. § 284.
172 There is, of course, substantial public investment in research. For example, in
2004, federal agencies funded roughly one-third of all U.S. biomedical R&D
and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) was itself responsible for three-
quarters of this amount. BHAVEN N. SAMPAT, Appendix D: The Impact of
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§ 1498 duplicates the deadweight loss problem associated with
patents. But how, then, should such compensation be
measured?
In answering this question, we seek to reconcile the
existing case law (which is far from pellucid) 173 with the
understanding of § 1498 developed above, as well as the values
that patents are understood to protect in the United States:
social welfare or "progress," rather than mere private rights.
174
Taking § 1498's purpose and precedent into account, courts
should set royalties in a way that allows the government to
prevent hold up while also protecting incentives to invest.
Three key principles can be distilled from the case law,
and provide us with a starting point. First, "lost profits" are
strongly disfavored, and perhaps entirely unavailable, under
§ 1498.175 As the courts have stressed in these cases, "[i]t is
Publicly Funded Biomedical and Health Research: A Review, in MEASURING
THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL INVESTMENTS IN RESEARCH: A WORKSHOP SUMMARY
153 (2011). Scaling up such research alongside exercise of § 1498 would be
possible, but a refinement we will not discuss here.
173 Courts in § 1498 cases, as in patent damages cases more generally,
frequently consider a very broad array of factors. See, e.g., Liberty
Ammunition, Inc. v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 368, 386 (2014) ("The
determination of a reasonable royalty requires a highly case-specific and fact-
specific analysis, relying upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense,
justice, policy and precedent."). Because so many factors are available to
courts, certainty in damages calculations will invariably be difficult to come
by. Our approach is intended to provide some certainty, though more could
surely be generated in other ways, for example through agency guidance
(which might shape expectations and negotiations) and Congressional
amendment.
174 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) ("The patent
monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his
discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new
knowledge."); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243
U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (" [T]he primary purpose of our patent laws is not the
creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents but is 'to promote the
progress of science and useful arts."' (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8)).
Welfarism-or efficiency (typically understood in Kaldor-Hicks or wealth
maximizing terms)-is widely considered the central value of intellectual
property law today in the United States. See William Fisher, Theories of
Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF
PROPERTY 168, 169 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); see also Lemley, supra
note 158, at 1031 ("Intellectual property protection in the United States has
always been about generating incentives to create.").
175 See DONALD S. CHISUM, 7 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03 (2015) ("There is some
doubt whether lost profits is a permissible basis for recovery against the
United States."); see also Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 348
(Ct. Cl. 1977), opinion modified on denial of reh'g, 557 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1977)
("[Elven if we assume that lost profit is still a viable measure of recovery under
28 U.S.C. § 1498, we cannot adopt that standard in this case because it has
not been sufficiently shown by clear and convincing evidence .... (emphasis
added)). In a recent case, the Federal Circuit suggested in dicta that "lost
profits should be recoverable in at least some [1498] infringement actions
against the government, even though the Fifth Amendment is implicated."
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equally a fundamental component of fairness to avoid excessive
compensation to the [patent owner] as it is to be sure not to pay
him too little." 176 Because patent holders are not entitled-
indeed, never have been entitled-to enjoin use for the federal
government, a lost profits approach risks overcompensation of
the patent holder. For this reason, the Federal Circuit has
repeatedly stressed that, in § 1498 cases, "4t]he proper
measure [of damages] is what the [patent] owner has lost, not
what the taker has gained."'177 The court's conclusion has been
driven by the eminent-domain-like nature of the statute1 78 and
by the important distinctions between § 1498 and ordinary
infringement actions.
1 79
As one commentator has put it,
The purpose of awarding damages under Title 35
is "to make the patent owner whole for losses
caused by the infringer's illicit activity. The
patent owner is to be restored financially to the
position he would have occupied but for the
infringement." This is consistent with the tort-
based foundation of Title 35. Section 1498,
however, does not seek to restore the patentee to
a position it would have occupied but for the
Government's "taking" of a license under the
patent, because it recognizes the Government's
right to effect that "taking." The only issue is the
Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The
reference to the Fifth Amendment refers to the statement in Leesona that
" [b]ecause recovery is based on eminent domain, the proper measure if'what
the owner has lost, not what the taker has gained."' See id. (internal citations
omitted).
176 Tektronix, 552 F.2d at 351.
177 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(quoting Leesona, 599 F.2d at 969 (citing United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 76 (1913))).
178 Leesona, 599 F.2d at 969 (citing eminent domain principles in reference to
government infringement).
179 Tektronix, 552 F.2d at 351 (under § 1498, the "goal of 'complete justice'
implies that only a reasonable, not an excessive, royalty should be allowed
where the United States is the user-even though the patentee, as a
monopolist, might be able to exact excessive gains from private users"). It is
also notable that § 1498 not only limits injunctions, for example, but also
prevents the federal government from being sued on theories of secondary
infringement or from being subject to punitive damages or normal attorney's
fees. David R. Lipson, We're Not Under Title 35 Anymore: Patent Litigation
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measure of the "reasonable compensation," not
making the patentee "whole."180
In every modern § 1498 case, then, the measure of
royalties has not been lost profits but rather a "reasonable
royalty." 181 This approach, in particular, aligns with the
legislative record and the historical use of the provision, both of
which reveal the law as, in part, a means to constrain excessive
pricing.1
82
The second key principle to emerge from the case law is
that "an established royalty is the best measure of
compensation [but] [a]bsent such a royalty, the Court of Claims
determines a reasonable royalty."183 If licenses (and even mere
offers to license) exist, they are typically very influential.184 But
appropriate benchmark licenses sometimes do not exist.
Indeed, they are unlikely to be present in pharmaceutical cases
because pharmaceutical patent holders do not commonly
license their lucrative patents after their products have come to
market. In the absence of existing licensing agreements, courts
often rely on the "willing-buyer, willing-seller rule," and
consult the wide range of factors (known as the Georgia-Pacific
factors) considered in most patent infringement cases. 185 In
§ 1498 cases, courts have referenced government cost savings
as a benchmark against which the royalty calculated under the
willing-buyer, willing-seller approach can be compared, but
this has been disfavored in more recent cases.186 Furthermore,
180 Lipson, supra note 179, at 254 (internal citations omitted).
181 CHISUM, supra note 175 § 20.03 (listing all awards under § 1498, and showing
that there has not been a lost profits award since 1930); see also Decca Ltd. v.
United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1173 (Ct. Cl. 1980) ("The reasonable royalty
method is the preferred method of ascertaining the value of patent rights
taken by the Government.").
182 See supra Part III.B.
183 CHISUM, supra note 175 § 20.03.
184 See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(upholding the trial court's reliance on amounts specified in a licensing offer);
see also Boeing Co. v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 303, 312 (2009) ("[Past]
agreements 'carry considerable weight in calculating a reasonable royalty
rate."') (internal citations omitted); cf. Gaylord v. United States, 678 F.3d
1339, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (in a copyright government use case under §
1498(b), remanding where evidence showed that the patentee had established
royalty rates from which the lower court had diverged).
185 In § 1498 patent cases, courts have largely used the fifteen-factor analysis
established in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp.
1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub. nom. Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S.
Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971); see Tektronix,
Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 349 (Ct. Cl. 1977), opinion modified on
denial of reh'g, 557 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
186 Leesona, 599 F.2d at 971 (" [While] savings to the government may be
considered in determining reasonable compensation," its best use "is in
estimating what royalty willing buyers and sellers would agree to. It has
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courts have repeatedly refused to adopt the patentee's claimed
profit margins as a royalty baseline. 187 Instead, courts, in
several more recent cases, have started with a baseline
calculated from the infringer's profits.188 This method, outlined
in the influential Tektronix decision, seeks to establish a
"residual share" of profits that can be allocated to the patentee
by "start[ing] with the infringers price, deduct[ing] its costs in
order to find its gross profit, then allocat[ing] to the infringer
its normal profit," and awarding the remainder, as the residual
share, to the patentee.189
Awards may also be adjusted from the baseline
established through the residual share method, bringing us to
the third key principle of compensation in § 1498 cases.
Adjustments to royalties may be warranted, the courts have
held, if the patentee "'took the risks and bore the expense of
developing the [infringing products] and creating a market for
them."1 90 Most instructive is the Federal Circuit's decision in
Leesona v. United States: There, the court treated the
minimum royalty that the patentee would be willing to accept
as equivalent to the "total development costs for its inventions
plus a reasonable profit, all allocated over the total estimated
quantity of procurement of sales."1 91 The court also imposed the
been done infrequently in the past and generally only when the calculation of
a reasonable royalty was difficult .... Even where savings to the government
are used as an acceptable measure of just compensation, no court has
awarded the total savings to the infringer as just compensation.").
187 See Honeywell Int'lv. U.S., 107 Fed. Cl. 659, 693 (2012). As the court
explained in Leesona, lost profits and government savings serve as "as
guidelines-none totally controlling but all testing [the] determination of the
reasonable royalty and compensation base." Leesona, 599 F.2d at 973.
188 See Tektronix, 552 F.2at 350; Honeywell, 107 Fed. Cl. at 693; Standard Mfg.
Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 748, 766 (1999). When parties have not
claimed a royalty based on the residual profit method, courts have
determined the baseline by critically assessing the royalty rates claimed by
the parties, Liberty Ammunition, Inc. v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 368, 386
(2014), or by simply averaging the rates claimed by the parties. Wright v.
United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 466, 475 (2002). In one modern case, despite
finding no evidence of past royalties, the Court of Claims forewent the
baseline determination, and instead calculated a royalty rate directly using
the multi-factor Georgia-Pacific test. Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 37 Fed.
Cl. 95, 108 (1997), affd, 113 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
189 Tektronix, 552 F.2d at 350-51 (applying this method to reach a residual share
of 4.6%, and increasing this to 10% after considering other factors);
Honeywell, 107 Fed. Cl. at 693 (applying this method to reach a residual
share of 4.2%, and adopting this as the reasonable royalty).
190 Honeywell, 107 Fed. Cl. at 693 (citing Tektronix, 552 F.2d at 350); see also
Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 11811 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (noting that
minimal investment in R&D will lower royalty rate).
191 CHISUM, supra note 175 § 20.03; see Leesona, 599 F.2d at 979 ("A floor on the
royalty would be provided by the expense incurred by Le[e]sona in developing
its invention, less any compensation received from defendant in its pre-1969
development contracts. The figure, with a reasonable profit, could be
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burden on the patentee to provide the relevant facts for this
analysis, concluding that "the party having the burden of proof
must suffer if a scantiness of record fails to support a fully
informed and reasoned determination." 
192
The best approach to compensation under § 1498, then,
would begin with the "residual royalty" earned by the infringer.
In the pharmaceutical context, this approach would typically
set a very low baseline. In the HCV example, if a course of
treatment that costs $900 to manufacture sells for $1000 and a
court found that the infringer enjoys a 10% profit on other
comparable products, the government would be liable for only
$90 per course in royalty payments. 193 Because generic
medicines are often so relatively inexpensive, and because
patent-holding firms will be able to claim that they paid for
extensive R&D, these rates should be grossed up to ensure
adequate incentives for innovation. This should result in a
reasonable measure of "what the [patent] owner has lost."194 In
other words, compensation should reflect the sunk costs of
R&D, but not lost exclusivity, since exclusivity was never an
entitlement.
As suggested in Leesona, courts can also factor into the
award "reasonable" profits, perhaps keyed to approximate
average industry returns. 195 Publicly available estimates
suggest that a 10 to 30% bounty would approximate average
profits in the pharmaceutical industry. 196 However, courts
amortized by the royalty attributable to the Eagle Picher procurement in the
proportion such procurement bore to the anticipated sales of the invention
during the patent life."); see also Penda Corp. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl.
533, 576 (1993) (questioning whether the patentee should recoup its entire
development cost from the government based on a single case of
infringement).
192 Leesona, 599 F.2d at 969.
193 In this example, the gross profit is $100. Following Tektronix, the infringer
would receive its usual share of profit ($10), while the remainder of the profit
would serve as a royalty for the patentee ($90). Tektronix, 552 F.2d at 351.
The royalty for the patentee, as a percentage of the sale price, would be 9%.
194 Leesona, 599 F.2d at 969.
195 Notably, similar bounties have been deployed in eminent domain law. For
example, the nineteenth century Mills Acts, which enabled private persons to
invade the riparian rights of upstream property owners, required takers to
pay property owners substantial bounties on top of market prices in order to
deter overuse and ensure adequate compensation. See, e.g., New Hampshire
Mill Act, 1868 N.H. Laws, ch. 20, § 3 (setting compensation for private
takings of riparian land at 150% of market value).
196 See SPIRO ET AL., supra note 17, at 7; Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical
Industry Gets High on Fat Profits, BBC NEWS, Nov. 6, 2014,
https://perma.cc/Z23H-B2A5 (finding that the world's ten largest
pharmaceutical companies have profit margins between 10% and 43%, with
the majority making about 20% margins); Trade, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy
and Health: The Pharmaceutical Industry, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://perma.cc/F6ZC-NYPC (last visited Sept. 10, 2015) (estimating average
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could fix the level of profit based on expert testimony and even
incorporate an additional margin to compensate for the risk of
error in their R&D assessments. Agencies would ideally also
issue guidelines to help establish the premium to be awarded
and diminish uncertainty associated with the reliance on
courts. Such guidelines would apply to voluntary settlements in
the shadow of § 1498 and perhaps also influence courts in their
damages calculations.
197
Protecting incentives to innovate and reasonably
compensating patentees, we think, also requires courts, where
possible (i.e., where the patentee is able to put forth credible
evidence on the point) to compensate patentees not just for
R&D expenditures but also the risk associated with those
expenditures. This follows from the high-risk nature of
pharmaceutical development. Before investing $1, for example,
a company will require a potential profit of $2 if there is a 50%
risk that the product it is developing will fail. Ideally, courts
could follow an option pricing approach, and (with the aid of
discovery and expert testimony) estimate R&D outlays and the
risk of failure at each stage of investment in a compound.
According to one recent estimate, the average probability that
an investigational compound, i.e. a new drug, will advance from
Phase I clinical testing to Phase II is about 60%. 198 The
probability that the drug will advance from Phase II to III
testing is about 20%.199 And the overall probability that a drug
that has entered clinical testing will be successful is about
10%.200 The most sophisticated approach to accounting for risk
would factor in outlays and risks at these different stages, and
use inputs specific to the drug or drug class in question.201 In
the absence of such evidence, courts might instead rely on
evidence regarding average failure rates, or average failure
profit margins at 30%); Frederic M. Scherer, Markets and Uncertainty in
Pharmaceutical Development 7 (Harvard KSG Fac. Res. Working Paper
Series, Working Paper No. RWP07-039, Sept. 2007), available at
https://perma.cc/JG8T-942G (arguing that pharmaceutical return on
investment was closer to 10% with appropriate accounting adjustments).
197 Congress could also pass an act to establish a damages formula. See, e.g., S.
Res. 15968, 114th Cong. § 7330B (2015) (Senator Bernie Sanders proposing a
bill that sets out factors the Secretary of the Veterans Administration should
consider when setting royalties for medications it provides under § 1498).
198 See Joseph A. Dil\lasi, Henry G. Grabowski, & Ronald W. Hansen, Innovation
in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH
ECON. 20, 24 tbl.2 (2016); see also James Love, The 2016 Tufts Estimates of
the Risk Adjusted Out-of-Pocket Costs To Develop a New Drug, KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY INT'L (Apr. 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/DT5N-JJN3.
199 DiMasi, Grabowski, & Hansen, supra note 198 at 24 tbl.2.
200 Id.
201 Different types of drugs can have dramatically different levels of risk
associated with their development. See Love, supra note 198.
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rates at the later stages of development which are the most
expensive.
202
There is also a sound innovation policy argument for
adjusting royalties to reflect the proportion of the worldwide
market for the drug comprised by the government's anticipated
use. If, for example, the government's § 1498 power is used only
to supply federally sponsored insurance and healthcare
programs, then damages might be pro-rated to reflect the
proportion of the global market that these payors represent.
One strength of using courts to effectively set an ex post prize
here is their ability to examine evidence of market share, which
may vary with the nature of the disease as well as over time.
While there are of course limits to the quality of
government information about these inputs,20 3 courts in § 1498
cases are well-situated to undertake the relevant inquiries. As
in Leesona, courts can impose the burden on the patentee-who
ought to be the cheapest provider of such information-to
produce information about R&D expenditures, risk, reasonable
profits, and worldwide market share. Courts can also protect
this information from broader disclosure through protective
orders and in camera review. Courts also have the benefit of
expert testimony and the flexibility under existing law to
award either a lump-sum or an ongoing royalty.
204
Even if courts may sometimes err in their calculations,
it should be noted that the resulting efficiency case for § 1498
remains strong, particularly in cases such as HCV. This is
because the efficiency gains from lower pricing are likely to be
large, given the amount of associated deadweight loss.
Consider the conventional deadweight loss graph in Figure One
above (reproduced below). Lowering the price in the context of
exclusive rights, from PM to P', both increases social welfare (by
Area B + C) and decreases patent-holder profits (by Area B -
A). As Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer have shown, even small
decreases in price under monopolistic conditions result in
extensive welfare gains, because "[t]he last bit of monopoly
pricing produces large amounts of deadweight loss for a
relatively small amount of patentee profit."20 5 As they put it,
"allowing patentees to raise price all the way to the monopoly
202 DiMasi, Grabowski, & Hansen, supra note 198 at 24 tbl.2.
203 See Demsetz, supra note 113, at 11-13.
204 See Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("A
reasonable royalty may be a lump-sum payment not calculated on a per unit
basis, but it may also be, and often is, a running payment that varies with
the number of infringing units. In that event, it generally has two prongs: a
royalty base and a royalty rate."); Liberty Ammunition, Inc. v. United States,
119 Fed. Cl. 368, 402 (2014) (establishing an ongoing, forward-looking royalty
rate in a § 1498 case).
205 Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 15, at 987.
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level is a little like giving them a license to steal car radios - it
produces social cost (to car owners) far greater than the private
benefit."
206







QM Q1  Quantity
While alternative approaches that would yield higher
royalties are not definitively foreclosed by existing law, the
approach we describe here has a sound basis in precedent,
reflects the purpose of § 1498, and promotes social welfare and
health. It also resonates with the academic literature on patent
damages in recent years, which has urged courts to move away
from the unpredictable 15-factor Georgia-Pacific test207 and to




207 J. Gregory Sidak, Bargaining Power and Patent Damages, 19 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 1, 3-4 (2015). Judge Richard Posner has asked, "could a judge or a jury
really balance 15 or more factors and come up with anything resembling an
objective assessment?" Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 911
(N.D. Ill. 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded,
757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014); David A. Haas, John R. Bone & Bruce W.
Burton, An Interview of Judge Richard A. Posner on Patent Litigation, STOUT
RisIus Ross (July 10, 2013), https://perma.cc/JY65-2RKA (" [T]he Georgia-
Pacific test is baloney. Fifteen factors, that's ridiculous.").
2o See Jorge L. Contreras & Richard J. Gilbert, A Unified Framework for Rand
and Other Reasonable Royalties, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1451, 1456 (2015);
Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 280, 308 (2010); Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured
Approach To Calculating Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627
(2010); Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust
Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1152-53 (2009); Mark A. Lemley & Carl
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B. When and How Should § 1498 Be Invoked?
If the static benefits of government use are large
enough, they will offset any dynamic losses imposed by error
from royalties set under § 1498. Partly for this reason, we
suggest that the government only invoke its § 1498 power
where drug pricing has created sizeable deadweight loss, as
with the new HCV medications. By focusing on these cases, the
government will ensure that social gains are substantial. As
with eminent domain, where the government often purchases
land on the private market despite having the power to take it,
so too should government use of patents be invoked in the
exceptional rather than routine case.
209
When deciding whether to invoke § 1498, the federal
government should consider two primary factors. The first
factor is the likelihood that firms command rents in excess of
risk-adjusted R&D costs plus a reasonable profit. Given our
compensation methodology, the government would have no
incentive to use the power where a drug's price was closely tied
to risk-adjusted R&D expenditures. It should be noted that
high drug prices may not always be a proxy for inefficiency. In
the context of rare diseases, for example, high prices may be
justifiable because firms must spread R&D costs over a much
smaller patient population. Such claims, of course, would need
to be carefully scrutinized on a case-by-case basis given the
potential for abuse.210 The second factor is the magnitude of
potential public health gain. If such gains are minimal, then
the benefits of invoking the mechanism might be too small to
justify the intervention. 211 Conversely, the presence of
209 See generally DANA & MERRILL, supra note 163. As we will describe, this
likely reflects the political pressures to avoid eminent domain, which would
also play a role in the patent context.
210 See Garret Kent Fellows & Aidan Hollis, Funding Innovation for Treatment
for Rare Diseases: Adopting a Cost-Based Yardstick Approach, 8 ORPHANET J.
RARE DISEASES 1, 1 (2013) (noting the blockbuster success of some rare
disease treatments and calling for a cost-based approach to rare disease drug
pricing).
211 Nevertheless, an interesting case could be made for the use of § 1498 in
situations where medications present little to no public health benefit, but
produce massive new drug markets. For example, in 1989, AstraZeneca,
introduced a new type of gastroesophageal reflux disease medication called
omeprazole. See FDA, ORANGE BOOK: APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH
THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS 314 (2015). More commonly known
by its brand name (Prilosec) this medication was the world's top selling drug
by 2000, earning over $6 billion per year in the United States. See Walid F.
Gellad et al., Assessing the Chiral Switch: Approval and Use of Single-
Enantiomer Drugs, 2001 to 2011, 20 AM. J. MANAGED CARE e90, e90 (2014).
Faced with omeprazole's patent expiration in 2001, id. at e90, AstraZeneca
began promoting a "new" version of the drug: esomeprazole, branded as
Nexium. Id. at e92. But the functional distinction between the two drugs is
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significant population-wide benefits, for example where
treatment also acts as a form of prevention, should counsel in
favor of using § 1498.
We imagine that government agencies would go beyond
our two-factor analysis to define the conditions for use of § 1498
more granularly and incorporate the input of experts. Such
definition would minimize the uncertainty companies face,
thereby protecting their incentives to invest. Even without
more fine-tuned analysis and elaboration, however, it is clear
that new HCV treatments satisfy both factors and are a prime
candidate for government use. Other candidates for § 1498 use
would become more apparent with more publically available
information about drug R&D costs. Fortunately, the lack of
transparency around drug development costs has spurred calls
for R&D disclosure requirements, with several state legislators
introducing bills to that effect. 212 Government agencies or
Congress, using their subpoena powers, may also be able to
gather the information needed to establish the set of drugs
suitable for § 1498 use.
extremely limited. Id. at e94. Prilosec (omeprazole) is a mixture of the active
and inactive enantiomers of the chiral drug omeprazole, whereas Nexium
(esomeprazole) is only the active enantiomer of the same chiral drug. Id. at
e90 ("A chiral drug is a single molecule product that exists in 2 mirror image
forms, called enantiomers."). Nevertheless, AstraZeneca obtained patent
protection on esomeprazole-the active enantiomer of the drug-and priced it
accordingly. Through a highly successful marketing campaign, AstraZeneca
then managed to convince prescribers and patients to prescribe and buy
esomeprazole, instead of the substantially cheaper generic versions of
omeprazole that came onto the market when the drug's patent expired.
Between 2001 and 2011, Medicaid programs spent $3.5 billion on
esomeprazole. Id. at e92. In 2014 alone, Medicare spent $2.66 billion on
esomeprazole-its second highest expenditure on any drug, bested only by
sofosbuvir. See Medicare Drug Spending Dashboard, CENTER FOR MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID SERVICES, https://perma.cc/9ELX-ETPD.
Although Nexium does not offer much by way of public health gain,
the drug may still present an interesting case for § 1498 use. Astrazeneca's
ability to charge such a high price for Nexium results from a market failure:
asymmetrical information about the true benefits of esomeprazole over
omeprazole. The government could threaten use of § 1498 in this case as a
means of reducing the financial burden on consumers and the government,
and reducing incentives for this kind of market manipulation. It is perhaps
unlikely, however, that the government would prioritize such a case, since
the medicine in question is not a health priority.
212 Andrew Pollack, Drug Prices Soar, Prompting Calls for Justification, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2015, https://perma.cc/397Z-6KKY (noting that
pharmaceutical transparency bills have been introduced in six state
legislatures to stiff opposition). The Presidential Advisory Council for
HIV/AIDS has also called for mandatory disclosure of R&D costs. Letter from
Nancy Mahon, Chair, Presidential Advisory Council for HIV/AIDS, to U.S.
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Reliance on § 1498 will be the exception rather than the
rule, in part because the government's mere invocation of its
government use power in a single pharmaceutical patent case
will immediately impact prices in other cases. Companies can
be expected to price in a way that reduces the risk that the
government will invoke its power under § 1498. This effect will
apply with equal force to later generations of new therapies. As
the Senate Report on Sovaldi reflects, a prominent
consideration for Gilead was the likelihood of government
reaction to its launch price.213
Finally, governments and companies would likely
negotiate in the shadow of any serious attempt to procure
generic medicines through § 1498. Such negotiations could
reduce uncertainty, advantaging all parties.214 As we discuss in
Part V.A, the statutory limits of § 1498 imply that, without
Congressional intervention, the government's immunity may
extend only to federal programs and state correctional
facilities. Through negotiations, however, the government could
explore the possibility of paying a lump sum to the patent
holder in exchange for non-exclusivity in all U.S. markets. In
other words, the government could use § 1498 as a tool to bring
a company into negotiations for a patent buyout. Such a buyout
would leverage the power inherent in § 1498 to generate a
more comprehensive approach, with greater health
implications, that allows all private and public payors to access
generic versions of the medication in question.
C. Addressing Objections
There are several possible objections to our approach
that should be countered before we move on. Four, in
particular, merit discussion. First, some may fear that our
proposal, despite the safeguards we propose, will under-
compensate innovators and thus undermine pharmaceutical
firms' incentives to innovate. We indeed expect our approach to
diminish industry profits, both in the specific cases where the
power is invoked and in other cases where dynamic effects from
213 Gilead did not envision the use of § 1498. Rather, it considered government
reactions in the form of prescribing restrictions and Congressional hearings.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 11, at 30.
214 Similarly, federal officials have previously credited the mere threat of using
the Bayh-Dole march-in authority for giving the government leverage in
licensing negotiations with contractors. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-09-742 FEDERAL RESEARCH: INFORMATION ON THE GOVERNMENTS
RIGHT TO ASSERT OWNERSHIP CONTROL OVER FEDERALLY FUNDED INVENTIONS
11-12 (2009), https://perma.cc/A39A-XNFM; see also Austin Frakt, Even
Talking About Reducing Drug Prices Can Reduce Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 2016, https://perma.cc/EX9J-M68K (discussing research that shows
political pressure can limit drug price growth).
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use of the power will influence drug prices. For example, if the
government invoked § 1498 over the new HCV drugs, patent-
holding companies might lose a substantial portion of the
approximately S10 billion in annual sales215 to the federal
government. 216 This, however, is precisely the point: these
profits create substantial deadweight loss and cannot plausibly
be considered necessary to induce research. The knock-on
effects on profits in cases where drugs are not directly subject
to government use will be smaller, but for the reasons
described by Ayres and Klemperer above, those too should yield
disproportionate welfare gains.
A related concern might be raised to our reliance on
average industry profits in a context where profits tend to be
skewed. In the pharmaceutical industry, a small number of
blockbusters generate a significant share of returns.2 7 If we
award firms the mean share of profits, we will reduce returns
on certain extremely lucrative drugs and also reduce the
internal capital that firms have available to invest in R&D. But
the result is not necessarily a less efficient system of drug
development and distribution. The effects on innovation may be
small, for example, if the central constraint in R&D is the
supply of innovations or if the elasticity of innovation with
respect to expected profits is relatively low. Reducing the
profits available for blockbusters could even increase dynamic
efficiency, because outsized rewards can induce wasteful racing
wherein parties expend more effort to be first to obtain a
reward (e.g., patents related to a potential new drugs) than
society gains from their race.218 Providing large rewards to
those who win encourages duplicative efforts, with entrants
dissipating resources along the way.219 Finally, even assuming
that incentives for innovation are reduced somewhat, the net
effects in efficiency terms-or, more simply, for health-can
still be strongly positive. This is because allowing inventors to
recover vastly more than their risk-adjusted R&D costs itself
yields inefficiencies. The primary inefficiency is deadweight
loss: namely, the restriction of supply associated with supra-
marginal cost pricing and the general taxation needed for the
215 Trade, Foreign Policy, WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 196.
216 See infra Part IV.D.
21. Henry Grabowski et al., Returns on Research and Development for 1990s New
Drug Introductions, 20 PHARMAECONOMICS 11, 27 (2002).
218 See Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure,
and the Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. ECON. 1, 12-15 (1980); Glenn C. Loury,
Market Structure and Innovation, 93 Q. J. ECON. 395, 405-08 (1979); Yoram
Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REv. ECON. & STAT. 348, 348
(1968).
219 Anupam B. Jena & Tomas J. Philipson, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and
Innovation, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 1224, 1229 (2008).
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government to pay for medicines. 220 Put simply, small
reductions in incentives for R&D may still be efficient if the
gains in terms of access are large.
A second objection might be raised to our reliance on
risk-adjusted R&D costs as a baseline for compensation, rather
than on a measure of social welfare itself, such as disability-
adjusted life years (DALYs) or quality-adjusted life years
(QALYs). 221 Many recent proposals for prizes and systems of
government price control rely on this metric, assuming that the
government should pay directly for the desired outcome of the
years of life or disability that are averted.
222
The difficulty with this approach comes from the
arbitrary nature of DALYs and QALYs themselves. Both
concepts have been developed in the context of cost-
effectiveness studies. Such studies widely adopt $50,000 to
$100,000 per QALY as the appropriate social valuation, and
imply that interventions that cost less than that per QALY are
cost-effective and should be purchased.223 DALYs and QALYs
are also a commonly used policy tool. For example, the United
Kingdom's National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE),
which makes pharmaceutical coverage decisions for the U.K.'s
National Health Service, currently uses a cost-effectiveness
threshold of about $28,000 to $42,000 per QALY. 22
4
220 Private insurers estimate that spending on new HCV drugs will result in a
five cent-per-hour tax on every single paycheck. N.L., Crippling, THE
ECONOMIST, June 4, 2015, https://perma.cc/XJ9F-YR32.
221 The quality-adjusted life year (QALY) measures the extent of health gain
from a healthcare intervention. It is calculated by multiplying the additional
life expectancy attributable to an intervention by the quality of that extended
life expectancy. One QALY reflects one year in perfect health. See, e.g., Luis
Prieto & Jos6 A. SacristAn, Problems and Solutions in Calculating Quality-
Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), 1 HEALTH & QUALITY OF LIFE OUTCOMES 80, 81
(2003). Conversely, the disability-adjusted life year (DALY) measures the
extent of health loss from a disease. It is calculated by adding the sum of
years of life lost due to premature mortality and years lived in disability or
disease. One DALY reflects the loss of one year of a healthy life. See Health
Statistics & Information Systems, Metrics: Disability-Adjusted Life Year
(DALY), WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://perma.cc/Y9SS-CYV2 (last visited Feb.
25, 2015).
222 See, e.g., Danzon et al., supra note 167, at 3; James Love & Tim Hubbard,
Prizes for Innovation of New Medicines and Vaccines, 18 ANNALS OF HEALTH
L. 155, 159-60 (2009); Aidan Hollis, An Efficient Reward System for
Pharmaceutical Innovation 2 (Working Paper, June 2004), available at
https://perma.cc/KM33-MB93.
223 See, e.g., Peter A. Ubel et al., What is the Price of Life and Why Doesn't it
Increase at the Rate of Inflation?, 163 ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED. 1637, 1637
(2003).
224 See Claxton, supra note 222, at xxix. Empirical work based on NICE
expenditures suggests that the central or "best" threshold would be closer to
$18,000 per QALY. See id. at xxx.
2016 323
49
Brennan et al.: A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 18
However, such cost-effectiveness thresholds have not
been systematically derived.225 For example, the lower bound
commonly used in the U.S. ($50,000 per QALY) was apparently
drawn from the price paid for renal dialysis by Medicare at the
time the threshold was accepted.226 As critics have pointed out,
"[t]here may be many [programs] that meet this critical ratio,
but to fund them all would imply that the opportunity cost of
healthcare resources was constant over whatever range of
expenditures are required to support all these programs."
227
This approach thus does not confront the problem of limited
resources. If a new invention were developed tomorrow that
saved one QALY for half of all Americans-150 million
people-a $50,000 threshold would suggest that the
appropriate price would be $7.5 trillion dollars. That is more
than twice the entire U.S. federal budget in 2015. Yet the
intervention may have been developed for far less, for example
for the $2.6 billion that represents the very high end of
estimates of the cost of developing a new drug. 228 Fixed
thresholds for cost-effectiveness therefore encourage industry
to raise the cost of interventions far beyond the prices needed
to induce them, and far beyond prices that are affordable from
a budgetary perspective. HCV drug pricing offers a good
example of this problem in practice.
A variant of this objection might suggest that our
approach will encourage companies to invest more heavily in
less socially valuable drugs. But our approach is designed to
compensate for risk and error, as well as to target medicines on
the basis of rent-seeking and health benefits, rather than
health benefits alone. In addition, our scheme envisions
significant returns, in addition to compensation, keyed to the
industry average. It would create a significant dynamic effect
only if there is both intense scarcity of investment dollars and a
225 They also differ in important ways from the kind of cost-benefit approach
more familiar in economics. For a summary, see Alan M. Garber & Charles E.
Phelps, Economic Foundations of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 16 J. HEALTH
ECON. 1 (1997). That approach itself is, of course, subject to deep critique, for
example, based on the limits of our empiricism as well as the political
implications of the technical nature of its claims.
226 Amiram Gafni & Stephen Birch, Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratios
(ICERs): The Silence of the Lambda, 62 Soc. ScI. & MED. 2091, 2093 (2006).
221 Id. at 2094.
228 How the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development Pegged the Cost of a
New Drug at $2. 6 Billion, TUFTS CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG
DEVELOPMENT (Nov. 18, 2014), available at https://perma.cc/V9GQ-GU5P.
This inflated figure has been heavily criticized in the literature. See, e.g.,
Jerry Avorn, The $2. 6 Billion Pill Methodologic and Policy Considerations,
372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1877 (2015). In 2001, Tufts estimated the cost to be
$800 million-about $1 billion in 2013 dollars. See Aaron E. Carroll, $2. 6
Billion To Develop a Drug? New Estimates Make Questionable Assumptions,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2014, https://perma.cc/VL98-5D72.
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large surplus of scientific opportunities for lucrative
investment.229 There is little reason, however, to think that
either circumstance prevails in the industry. The latest and
most robust empirical assessments of the pharmaceutical
industry suggest that it has a relatively low elasticity of
innovation of approximately 0.25; "when a market increases in
potential size by 10%, that stimulates a 2.5% increase in the
number of treatments to serve that market."230 While it is not
surprising that greater potential market returns yield more
investment, the relationship is far from proportionate. It may
be due to "decreasing margins as competition intensifies,"
increasing likelihood of duplicate efforts "as more firms are
attracted into a market," and the fact that "if there is a limited
amount of 'low-hanging fruit' to be plucked, then the more
research teams are seeking to enter a market, the lower will be
the average productivity of each."
231
As work on racing problems suggests, the innovation
foregone when returns are reduced can also have positive
welfare implications that arise from preventing duplicative
work or overinvestment in speed. Again, even assuming static
net losses to innovation, our approach will have net positive
welfare effects as long as the dynamic gains-sure to be very
large in cases like HCV-are larger than those losses. We note,
moreover, that the federal government can account for all of
these concerns when calculating adequate returns for the
industry under § 1498. Using experts and agencies, the
government can also develop a more sophisticated
compensation approach than the one we employ here, with
more precise estimates of deadweight losses, innovation
elasticities, and profits needed to induce investment.
A third objection to § 1498 is potential overuse by the
federal government. Here, the eminent domain literature is
again helpful. As scholars have pointed out, the assumption
that the government will abuse its eminent domain power
conflicts with public choice insights about the relationship
between concentrated interests and political action.232 Takings
will tend to produce diffuse social benefits and acute costs.
229 See, e.g., Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in
Pharmaceuticals, 19 INT'L J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 101-02 (2000) (noting that
imperfect capital markets and limited external funds may mean that current
revenue has an impact on firm investments in R&D).
230 Pierre Dubois, Olivier de Mouzon, Fiona Scott-Morton, & Paul Seabright,
Market Size and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 46 RAND J. ECON. 844, 845
(2015). Earlier estimates tended to put the figure higher, for example around
0.5. Id.
231 Dubois et al., supra note 230, at 848.
232 Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Property Law, Working Paper No. 9695,
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Therefore, we should perhaps worry about underuse, rather
than overuse, of the power. The history of § 1498 in the
pharmaceutical context supports the public choice point.
Despite its availability, the statute has not been used by the
government to procure medications in decades. The patent-
based pharmaceutical industry's notorious lobbying power
233
suggests that underuse is indeed a greater risk than is overuse.
Finally, some may see our proposal as giving too much
responsibility and discretion to courts to make decisions with
important effects on innovation policy. We see the risk, but
note that courts regularly-and inevitably-adjudicate
disputes and assess damages in cases with very significant
innovation policy effects. Our recommended approach to
damages responds to the criticisms levied at the conventional
approach to damages in this context-the "simple" application
of the Georgia-Pacific factors, which have long been criticized
as leading to inappropriate and inconsistent damages
awards. 234 Courts will play a significant role in setting
damages, but this is the structure that Congress demanded
when it passed § 1498. As with eminent domain, if the
government is to have a right to a liability rather than a
property rule, courts must play a role in setting damages. That
role might, however, be merely a backstop. Agencies can
establish guidelines that will shape any bargaining around the
courts' powers, thereby influencing courts' calculations and
reducing uncertainty about how courts would assess damages.
Notably, the government and patent holders can
minimize compensation uncertainty by negotiating voluntary
licenses as previously described. Should courts rely on our
damages methodology, the government and patent holders
could come to voluntary agreements, based on the knowledge
that court-ordered damages awards would be keyed to risk-
adjusted R&D costs.
D. Application of the R&D-Based Compensation
Methodology to the HCV Context
233 The pharmaceutical and health products industry has spent more each year
on federal lobbying than any other industry since 1999. See Influence and
Lobbying: Top Industry, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://perma.ce/SKY5-E6Q3 (last
visited Feb. 28, 2016). The pharmaceutical industry's influence over Congress
has been documented on numerous instances, including in passing the
Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (which established the Part D program)
and the Affordable Care Act. See Andrea Seabrook, Drug Firms Pour $40
Million into Health Care Debate, NAT'L PUB. RADIo (July 23, 2009),
https://perma.cc/J3E2-PE48; Michelle Singer, Under the Influence, 60
MINUTES (Mar. 29, 2007 https://perma.cc/34NN-9TRY.
234 See supra note 207-208.
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In the HCV context, we have a considerable amount of
information relevant to our proposed compensation
methodology. Given the availability of data surrounding
Gilead's drugs, including approximate costs of developing its
sofosbuvir-based products, we use government procurement of
these drugs under § 1498 to illustrate how our approach to
damages would work in practice.
Sofosbuvir was initially developed by a now-defunct
company named Pharmasset. 235 In its earliest phases,
sofosbuvir was supported by government funding, including
grants to put the drug through early clinical trials.236 These
initial years, from 2008-2011, cost Pharmasset $62.4 million. 237
By 2012, the drug's promise was clear, and Gilead purchased
the compound (and Pharmasset itself) for $11.2 billion.238 This
purchase price was extraordinary, given Pharmasset's level of
investment to that point.239 Indeed, the price is suggestive of
the racing described above: Gilead paid a sum radically
disproportionate to investment in the drug because of the
drug's promise and Gilead's ability to unilaterally set the
drug's launch price.240
After its purchase, the company reported $880 million
in R&D spending on all sofosbuvir-containing regimens, which
in addition to sofosbuvir (Sovaldi) and its follow-on
combination drug, sofosbuvir/ledipasvir (Harvoni), includes two
other compounds. 241 For the sake of convenience-and we
stress that with more data, this estimate could be much more
precise-we generously assume Gilead's R&D investment in
sofosbuvir and sofosbuvir/ledipasvir was $800 million, yielding
total R&D costs of under $870 million (Gilead's $800 million
plus Pharmasset's $62.4 million).
235 See Troyen Brennan & William Shrank, New Expensive Treatments for
Hepatitis C Infection, 312 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 593, 593 (2014).
236 Jeffery Sachs, The Drug that is Bankrupting America, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 16, 2015, 11:01 AM), https://perma.cc/F6ZG-KHGS.
237 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 11, at 13. Pharmasset moved the
drug through phase II trials and had initiated phase III clinical trials. See
Sachs, supra note 236.
238 See John Carroll, Pharmasset science founder lands a fortune from $11B
Gilead buyout, FIERCEBIOTECH (Nov. 23, 2011), https://perma.cc/V87Q-63FZ.
239 See id. A Gilead executive nonetheless described the acquisition later as a
"bargain." STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 11, at 17.
240 Significantly underestimating this power, Pharmasset originally planned to
sell a course of treatment at $36,000. Gilead's price tag for Sovaldi in 2013
was more than double Pharmasset's projected price for the drug in 2011.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 11, at 17. Racing was also present
as "Gilead was not only concerned about ensuring it could acquire
Pharmasset's promising molecule, [but] it was [also] aware that it could move
too slowly and miss the chance to purchase the company in a highly
competitive industry." Id. at 14.
241 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 11, at 22 n. 111, 23.
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In less than two and a half years, Gilead has made
about $36 billion on its sofosbuvir-based drugs, Sovaldi and
Harvoni.242 Gilead has not only recouped nearly three times the
$11 billion purchase price of Pharmasset, but has also likely
already earned around forty times the cost of developing the
drugs. Such a return on investment is surely adequate to
induce this type of investment. Even adjusting for risk, and
factoring in reasonable profit, society has already vastly
overpaid for the drugs, particularly considering how little
treatment the $36 billion expenditure has purchased.
Under our proposed compensation method, the
government would be able to procure enough of the new
medicines to treat all of those with HCV for a far smaller sum.
Assume, for example, that the government sought to procure
generic sofosbuvir/ledipasvir for all those living with HCV in
the US.243 In the absence of appropriate benchmark licenses,
the first step in determining damages involves establishing a
baseline royalty, using the residual profit method described in
Tektronix.244 Assume a generic price of $500 (similar to the
current price of generic treatment available in other
countries),245 a manufacturing cost of $100,246and an average
infringer profit rate of 10%. The $400 profit margin on
sofosbuvir/ledipasvir would translate into a baseline royalty of
$360 per course of treatment for Gilead.
Courts would then consider whether the royalty should
be adjusted to compensate for R&D costs and risks and add a
premium for profits.247 Assume a total $870 million R&D cost
242 See Gilead's 4th-qtr Sales and Earnings Beat Expectations, as Harvoni Soars,
THEPHARMALETTER (Mar. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/PVK8-MLTD. In 2015,
Gilead's sales of sofosbuvir/ledipasvir reached $13.86 billion and sales of
sofosbuvir were $5.28 billion. In 2014, Gilead's sales of sofosbuvir/ledipasvir
were $2.13 billion and sales of sofosbuvir were $10.28 billion. In the first
quarter of 2016, Gilead's sales of sofosbuvir/ledipasvir and sofosbuvir totaled
$4.29 billion. Press Release, Gilead Sciences, Gilead Sciences Announces
First Quarter 2016 Financial Results (Apr. 28, 2016, 4:04PM), available at
https://perma.cc/3LQK-U8UR.
243 The calculation is intended as illustrative only: our figures are rough
estimates, and reaching everyone with HCV may require Congressional
action. See infra Part V.A (discussing the scope of government use under
§ 1498).
244 See Tektronix, 552 F.2d at 349; see also Honeywell, 107 Fed. Cl. at 693;
Standard Mfg., 42 Fed. Cl. at 766.
245 Hill, supra note 13, at 30; HEPATITIS C IN ASIA, supra note 13.
246 This is the estimated cost of manufacturing of sofosbuvir. Hill, supra note 13,
at 30.
247 See Leesona, 599 F.2d at 978 ("A floor on the royalty would be provided by the
expense incurred by Le[e]sona in developing its invention, less any
compensation received from defendant in its pre-1969 development contracts.
The figure, with a reasonable profit, could be amortized by the royalty
attributable to the Eagle Picher procurement in the proportion such
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(again, likely an overestimate).248 We lack specific information
on risk of failure for these drugs, so assume a 10 to 20% chance
of success (with the lower bound of 10% representing the
general likelihood a drug that begins trials succeeds, and the
upper bound of 20% representing the general rate of success in
Phase III trial, when the majority of expenditures occur).
249
Add a 30% profit premium, which is our rough estimate of
average industry profit rates, and the resulting compensation
award would be between $5.65 and $11.3 billion.
250
This is a broad range, based on rough estimates; a court
could be far more precise, because it could require that Gilead
produce evidence, and also admit expert testimony. Our rough
calculation, however, makes two important points. First,
payments for innovative companies under government use can
easily reach billions of dollars, and protect incentives to invest.
Prospectively, companies should be happy to invest $870
million for a 10% chance of $11.3 billion, for example. Second,
in this case, no upwards adjustment on the baseline royalty
would be justified, because Gilead has already earned more
than three times the largest estimate from sales of its
sofosbuvir-based regimens. This highlights just how extreme
the rent seeking in this case has been.
251
Using our method of compensation, the government
could thus provide sofosbuvir/ledipasvir treatments at only the
baseline royalty rate. The total cost per treatment would be an
estimated $860 per course of treatment (with $500 paid to the
generic supplier and $360 paid as a royalty to Gilead). The
current best-reported prices of sofosbuvir-based drugs are
about $45,000,252 and some payers are still paying more for the
procurement bore to the anticipated sales of the invention during the patent
life.").
248 We do not use Pharmasset's $11.2 billion purchase price as a proxy for R&D
costs because reliance on this figure might further encourage the inefficient
racing that led Gilead to agree to this purchase price in the first place.
249 DiMasi et al., supra note 198, at 24 tbl.2; see supra Part IV.A.
250 ($870 million x 5) + (($870 million x 5) x 0.30) = $5.65 billion; ($870 million x
10) + (($870 million x 10) x 0.30) = $11.3 billion). This could additionally be
adjusted downward to account for the share of U.S. government use in the
worldwide market for the drug, if evidence on this were available to the court.
Ideally, the U.S. government should only compensate patent holders for part
of their R&D costs, because the U.S. government is only responsible for part
of the patent holders' revenue. See Penda Corp. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl.
533, 576 (1993) (questioning whether the patentee should recoup its entire
development cost from the government based on a single case of
infringement).
251 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 11, at 2.
252 Gilead has reported that it offers average discounts of 46%, but many
government payors do not have access to discounts this steep. See infra note
76-88 and accompanying text.
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drugs.253 It would cost at least $234 billion to treat all 5.2
million Americans with HCV at $45,000 per patient,254 while
our approach would cost $4.47 billion. Recall, too, that the U.S.
government market is only a portion of the global market, so
the gross returns to the company would be greater still.
Our approach could thus save hundreds of billions of
dollars, enable rapid scale up in the health benefits associated
with these medicines, and leave companies assured of a reward
sizeable enough to attract future investment. Scaling up now
would also generate positive externalities for decades to come
by preventing new infections.
V. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR INVOKING § 1498
IN THE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
Using § 1498 to infringe drug patents presents two
unique difficulties that the existing literature has not
addressed. Both issues arise out of interactions between the
government use power and the complexity of the U.S.
healthcare system.
First, § 1498 may only be invoked when a patented
invention "is used or manufactured by or for the United
States. ' 255 The phrase "for the United States" includes and
indemnifies infringement by contractors, subcontractors, or
other persons, firms, or corporations acting "for the
Government and with the authorization or consent of the
Government." 256 Below we explore when procurement of
generics by a variety of health providers fulfills this condition.
Second, under the Food Drug & Cosmetics Act (FDCA),
pharmaceutical companies must submit safety and efficacy
data to the FDA before this agency will approve their drugs
and allow them to sell those medicines in the United States.257
As a reward for producing this data, the FDCA prohibits other
pharmaceutical manufacturers from relying on the data to gain
approval for their own drugs for a five-year period.258 This
253 See Am. Ass'n for the Study of Liver Diseases & Infectious Diseases Soc. of
Am., supra note 101.
254 See supra note 9.
255 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2012).
256 Id.
257 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) & (b) (2012).
258 See Id. § 355(c)(3)Q(ii-iv); see also JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RES. SERV., R42890,
THE ROLE OF PATENTS AND REGULATORY EXCLUSIVITIES IN PHARMACEUTICAL
INNOVATION 4-7 (Jan. 7, 2013). Data exclusivity for Sovaldi (sofosbuvir),
Harvoni (ledipasvir/sofosbuvir), and Viekira Pak (ombitasvir, paritaprevir,
and ritonavir tablets; dasabuvir) expire on December 6, 2018, October 10,
2019, and December 19, 2019, respectively. See Press Release, FDA Approves
Sovaldi for Chronic Hepatitis C, Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 6, 2013),
available at https://perma.cc/CG7T-6V4Q; Press Release, FDA Approves First
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period of exclusivity is generally known as data exclusivity. We
discuss the applicability of data exclusivity laws to § 1498, as
well as two possible methods of obtaining FDA approval for
generic drugs procured under § 1498.
A. "Government Use" and Public-Private Divisions in
Healthcare
In Part IV, we discussed the circumstances that justify
using § 1498 to acquire generic medicines. Here, we consider
the statutory language limiting the scope of § 1498 to
determine which sectors of the healthcare system may access
generic medicines procured under § 1498. As we explained
above, the provision applies under two scenarios: first, when
the United States uses or manufactures a patented product
without a license; and second, when a third party, such as a
government contractor, infringes for the United States. In the
first scenario, the federal government accepts liability when it
directly infringes the patent; in the second, the federal
government assumes liability for third-party infringements on
its behalf.259 The scope of any action to procure and distribute
generic medicines under § 1498 will turn on the breadth of the
statute's shield for various parties.
The federal government's involvement in the use of
prescription drugs can be divided into three tiers. It is most
directly involved in federally run healthcare programs, where
federal officers procure medicines directly from drug
manufacturers. Examples of such programs include the
Veterans Health Administration, Department of Defense,
Indian Health Service, and Federal Bureau of Prisons.260 At the
next level are federally sponsored health insurance programs,
notably Medicare and Medicaid. Under these programs, the
federal government pays for the majority of healthcare costs,
but relies on states and private entities to procure and
distribute prescription drugs.26 1 Furthest removed are state-
sponsored healthcare programs and private health insurance
Combination Pill to Treat Hepatitis C, Food & Drug Admin. (Oct. 10, 2014),
available at https://perma.cc/RXM2-LMJ8; Press Release, FDA Approves
Viekira Pak to Treat Hepatitis C, Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 19, 2014),
available at https://perma.cc/62CG-FPMP.
259 Madeyv. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("In general, there
are two important features of § 1498(a). It relieves a third party from patent
infringement liability, and it acts as a waiver of sovereign immunity and
consent to liability by the United States.").
260 GRETCHEN A. JACOBSON ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33802,
PHARMACEUTICAL COSTS: A COMPARISON OF DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
(VA), MEDICAID, AND MEDICARE POLICIES 8-11 (2007).
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plans. The federal government regulates and subsidizes such
plans through the tax system to varying extents, but plays no
role in their drug purchasing processes.26 2 With respect to state
correctional facilities, the federal government's regulatory
authority includes ensuring that conditions of confinement are
consistent with the U.S. Constitution,26 3 including the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on "deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners." 264 This section addresses the
extent to which § 1498 allows the federal government to
assume liability for patent infringement within and across
these tiers.
Section 1498 is an assumption of federal liability under
a theory of sovereign immunity. As such, when the procurer of
the infringing product is not the government itself, the statute
imposes two requirements: the use of the patented invention by
a third party must be (1) "for the Government"; and (2) "with
the authorization or consent of the Government."2 6 5 If a use is
not for the government, then the logic of sovereign immunity
does not apply: private parties, not sovereigns, would be
immunized. If a use is not with the authorization or consent of
the government, then the government has not agreed to waive
its sovereign immunity and is not liable for damages. We refer
to these two requirements collectively as § 1498's "government
use" test.
Courts have treated the second requirement-whether
the government has authorized use-expansively to
accommodate express and implied as well as ex ante and ex post
consent. 266 This flexibility equally accommodates situations
where the government knows in advance that third parties will
262 See BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ & NAMRATA K. UBEROI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL32237, HEALTH INSURANCE: A PRIMER 7-8 (Jan. 8, 2015) (discussing the
regulation of private health insurance, including tax provisions to expand
health insurance coverage); Mary V. Muse, Regulations, Standards and
Policies, NATIONAL COMM'N ON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE,
https://perma.cc/PG9R-5MW3 (last visited Sept. 13, 2015) (describing the mix
of state, federal, and private regulations that apply to correctional health
systems).
263 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq. (2012)
(authorizing the United States to enforce the rights of incarcerated
individuals).
264 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
265 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
266 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889, 901 (Ct. Cl. 1976)
("' [A]uthorization or consent' on the part of the Government may be given in
many ways other than by letter or other direct form of communication' [sic]-
e.g., by contracting officer instructions, by specifications or drawings which
impliedly sanction and necessitate infringement, by post hoe intervention of
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infringe patents on its behalf26 7 and where the government
learns, after the fact, that its demands of third parties have
necessitated infringement (for example, where a contractor
must infringe a patent to fulfill the terms of its contract with
the government, but the government is not aware of this issue
until after the infringement has occurred). 268 As we will
describe below, consent also may be found if entities are
infringing to fulfill obligations under federal law. 269 This
approach makes sense: as the Federal Circuit has explained,
"The coverage of § 1498 should be broad so as not to limit the
Government's freedom in procurement by considerations of
private patent infringement." 270
With respect to the first requirement, in cases where the
infringing party has shown that they are acting pursuant to a
contract with the federal government, courts typically assume
use "for" the government without further inquiry.271 The harder
cases arise when no contract exists. In such instances, courts
have interpreted use "for" the government to mean that the
infringement must benefit the government in some non-
incidental way. 272 But the line between sufficient and
insufficient government benefit is not entirely defined.273 The
267 See, e.g., Sevenson Envtl Servs., Inc. v. Shaw Envtl, Inc., 477 F.3d 1361,
1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding that the contract included an express
authorization clause).
268 See, e.g., TVI Energy Corp. v. Blane, 806 F.2d 1057, 1060 (1986) (finding that
government bidding requirements can imply authorization to infringe).
269 See, e.g., IRIS Corp. v. Japan Airlines Corp., 769 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2014) ("In this case, the government has clearly provided its authorization or
consent because-as the parties and the United States agree-JAL cannot
comply with its legal obligations without engaging in the allegedly infringing
activities."); cf Larson v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 365, 371 (1992) (" [B]ecause
there is no orthotic procedure recognized by Medicare as 'necessary' that
requires the use of plaintiffs' patents, the Medicare Act provides no basis to
find implied consent to any provider's alleged infringement.").
270 TVEnergy Corp., 806 F.2d at 1060.
271 Sevenson Envt'l Servs., Inc., 477 F. 3d at 1366 (" [W]here infringing activity
has been performed by a government contractor pursuant to a government
contract and for the benefit of the government, courts have all but bypassed a
separate inquiry into whether infringing activity was performed 'for the
Government."').
272 Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 583 F.3d
1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Sheridan v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl.
127, 131 (2015) ("Where benefits to the Government are merely an incidental
effect of private conduct, they do not constitute 'use or manufacture for the
Government' within the meaning of § 1498." (quoting Advanced Software, 583
F.3d at 1379)). Use "for" the government can be present even where the
"primary" beneficiary is a private party. See Advanced Software, 583 F.3d at
1378 (finding government use, despite the fact that the primary benefits
accrued to private banks, because the use also served national interests such
as the interest in "averting fraud in Treasury checks").
273 For example, in Larson v. United States, the Court of Claims (the predecessor
court of the Federal Circuit) held that the tangential monetary benefit that
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Federal Circuit tends to align itself with the government's
position, whether the government argues that it benefits from
infringing conduct or not.
274
Applying these two conditions to our fragmented
healthcare system will raise novel fact patterns that courts
have yet to consider, especially where the federal government
does not have any direct role in drug procurement. But the
federal government's role as insurer of last resort, coupled with
its responsibility for enforcing many statutory and
constitutional obligations that affect state and even private
actors, creates a plausible case that § 1498 can apply to
providing generic drugs, including HCV treatments, across the
healthcare system.
Starting with the simplest case, for programs the
federal government controls directly, such as the Veterans
Health Administration, the federal use requirement is easily
accrued to the government when Medicare reimbursed providers for cheaper,
infringing splints was inadequate, on its own, to constitute use "for the
Government." Larson, 26 Cl. Ct. at 369 ("Medical care is provided for the
benefit of the patient, not the government .... The fact that the government
has an interest in the program generally, or funds or reimburses all or part of
its costs, is too remote to make the government the program's beneficiary for
the purposes underlying § 1498." (citations omitted)). In contrast, in IRIS
Corp. v. Japan Airlines Corp., the Federal Circuit found that the government
benefitted from a Japanese airline's scanning of electronic passports made
according to a patented process, finding that the infringing conduct "directly
enhance [d] border security and improve [d] the government's ability to
monitor the flow of people into and out of the country." 769 F.3d 1359, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2014). The government did not expressly authorize the infringing
conduct in either case; however, in IRIS, the Federal Circuit found such
authorization was implied.
274 Compare id. at 1363 ("We also note that the United States has unequivocally
stated its position that suit under § 1498(a) is appropriate here.... Although
the government's statement is not dispositive, it reinforces our conclusion
that the United States has waived sovereign immunity in this case and,
therefore, that IRIS's exclusive remedy is suit for recovery against the United
States under § 1498(a)."), and Advanced Software, 583 F.3d at 1376 ("The
communications from the United States to the Federal Reserve Banks,
reinforced by the request by the United States to intervene in the district
court and its representations to this court that the accused activities are 'for
the United States' and with its authorization or consent, established the
applicability of § 1498(a)."), with Larson v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 365
(1992) (the United States successfully opposed the plaintiffs attempt to hold
it liable for the infringement of patents by healthcare providers reimbursed
by Medicare and other public insurance programs). This deferential approach
appears to track how federal courts approach the "public use" requirement in
eminent domain proceedings. As Thomas Merrill has observed, "courts have
become increasingly uncomfortable in defining the correct or 'natural ends of
government. Not surprisingly, therefore, courts have adopted a hands-off
posture regarding questions of public use." Merrill, supra note 166, at 64. The
courts' approach to the public use requirement in eminent domain cases is
informative due to the similarities between § 1498 and eminent domain.
334
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met.275 If the government directed its contractors to procure
generic HCV medicines and agreed to assume liability on their
behalf, it would satisfy the government benefit requirement.276
These contractors would also have little difficulty
demonstrating that their procurement of generic HCV
treatments benefits the federal government, should a court
inquire further. As we discussed in Part II, public programs
have struggled to afford treatment for just a fraction of HCV-
infected enrollees. 277 While the Veterans Health
Administration removed its access restrictions following public
and Congressional criticism, 278 the Indian Health Service does
not even offer the new HCV treatments on its formulary.279
Procurement of generic HCV drugs would enable these
programs to make treatment available to all enrollees at
significantly lower cost. The monetary savings that would
result from generic use would not be "incidental" to private
interests, but rather the antecedent to achievement of the
central goals of these federal programs.
Although the application of § 1498 to the Medicare and
Medicaid programs is slightly more complex, the outcome
should be the same. Under Medicaid, the federal government
enters into agreements with drug manufacturers to set the
terms of their participation in the program,280 but an array of
state (rather than federal) contractors are responsible for
procuring and distributing covered drugs.281 For Medicare, the
federal government contracts with private health insurance
275 See supra note 260 and accompanying text (describing how certain federal
agencies purchase drugs directly from manufacturers). Procurement agents
are required to review bids without regard to patent status, see supra note
138, and Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) establish standardized
procedures and language for granting authorization and consent to use or
manufacture a patented invention in federal contracts. See FAR 27.201-2 &
52.227-1 (2013).
276 The Federal Circuit has observed that government benefit can be assumed
when the infringer is a government contractor acting pursuant to its contract
or where the infringement is related to "a 'governmental function' that the
government had sought or required the [infringer] to carry out." Sevenson
Envtl Servs., Inc. v. Shaw Envtl, Inc., 477 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
see also JACOBSON, supra note 260, at 8-11 (describing how the federal
government contracts with drug manufacturers and other businesses to
facilitate the ordering, payment, and physical shipment of drugs).
277 See supra Part II.B.
218 Patricia Kime, VA Expands Hepatitis C treatment o All Patients with the
Virus, MILITARY TIMES, Mar. 10, 2016, https://perma.cc/8RFQ-SA3J.
279 See IHS NATIONAL PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS COMMITTEE, NATIONAL CORE
FORMULARY (May 25, 2015), available at https://perma.cc/C8R4-PCND.
280 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(a)(1) (2012).
281 For a general overview of how prescription drug coverage is provided in
Medicaid, see DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
OEI-03-11-00480, COLLECTION OF REBATES FOR DRUGS PAID THROUGH
MEDICAID MCOS 1-5 (Sept. 2012), available at https://perma.cc/X6XW-UTK6.
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plans to provide drug coverage, rather than directly dealing
with the drug manufacturers or distributors.28 2 Thus, to the
extent that entities involved in Medicaid and Medicare drug
procurement do not contract with the federal government
directly, the federal government could issue letters consenting
to infringement and assuming liability for any subsequent
claims related to the provision of generic HCV medicines.
28 3 It
could then make a similar argument for governmental benefit
here as it would for direct federal purchasers: the federal
government pays the majority of drug costs for both Medicare
and Medicaid,284 and therefore stands to save substantially
from the switch to generic HCV treatment. Such a change
would also substantially increase access to treatment.
Private health insurance coverage and state-run
healthcare programs represent more novel circumstances and
282 For the same with respect to Medicare, see U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-09-819T, OVERVIEW OF APPROACHES TO CONTROL PRESCRIPTION
DRUG SPENDING IN FEDERAL PROGRAMS 7-8 (2009), available at
https://perma.cc/P5ZW-N69F.
283 Section 1498 is clear that the government need not have a direct contractual
relationship with a third-party to shield it from liability, so long as that party
is acting with the consent and on behalf of the government. 28 U.S. C. §
1498(a) (2012) ("For the purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of an
invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States by a
contractor, a subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation for the
Government and with the authorization or consent of the Government, shall
be construed as use or manufacture for the United States" (emphasis added));
see also Sheridan v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 127, 130-32 (2015) affd, No.
2015-5073, 2015 WL 5845301 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("While neither a contractual
nor an agency relationship is necessary for the Government to accept
infringement liability for actions of private parties, Plaintiff must
demonstrate that the 'activities by 'any person, firm, or corporation' [are] for
the benefit of the government."' (quoting Advanced Software Design Corp. v.
Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 583 F.3d 1371, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2009))).
The courts have recognized that in such scenarios, "'authorization or consent'
on the part of the Government may be given in many ways other than by
letter or other direct form of communication[]--e.g., by contracting officer
instructions, by specifications or drawings which impliedly sanction and
necessitate infringement, by post hoc intervention of the Government in
pending infringement litigation against individual contractors." Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889, 901 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (internal
citation omitted); see also Advanced Software, 583 F.3d at 1377-78 (finding
authorization and consent from correspondence from a government agency to
the infringer and from statements of the government acting as amicus
curiae).
284 See Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., The Medicare Part D Prescription Drug
Benefit Fact Sheet (Oct. 13, 2015), https://perma.cc/B8TZ-DEH2 ("Financing
for Part D comes from general [federal] revenues (73%), beneficiary
premiums (14%), and state contributions (13%)"); HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., MEDICAID FINANCING: AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL MEDICAID
MATCHING RATE (FMAP) 1-5 (Sept. 2012), available at https://perma.cc/94NJ-
JZQH (describing the federal government's contribution to the cost of
Medicaid services across states and eligibility groups).
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could push the boundaries of the "government use" test.
Whereas federal officials have broad implementation authority
over Medicare, Medicaid, and direct federal purchasing
programs, the federal government's involvement with private
and state insurers is more circumscribed.28 5 Section 1498 does
not overtly limit who may give the government's consent to
assume liability or under what circumstances such consent can
be given. Can any government official commit the government
to assuming liability for a private or state party's patent
infringement so long as that official makes a plausible
argument that the federal government would benefit in some
way? Presumably some limits exist, but the existing case law-
focused primarily on infringement by parties operating under
contracts or grants that were presumably congressionally
authorized-does not clearly define these limits.
It does however show that consent may be established
via federal legal mandates. In IRIS Corp. v. Japan Airlines
Corp., for example, IRIS sued JAL for examining electronic
passports that were made with a method claimed in a patent
owned by IRIS. The court found that JAL was shielded by
§ 1498 even though the government had no contract or other
formal relationship with the infringing airline.2 86 It found that
consent was present because the airline could not "comply with
its legal obligations [to examine passengers' passports] without
engaging in the allegedly infringing activities."
28 7
The logic here is extremely expansive, and for example
could lead to a finding of consent to infringe for state
correctional facilities that purchase generic HCV medications
to fulfill their constitutional obligation to provide healthcare.
Researchers estimate that one in every six inmates is infected
and that nearly one-third of HCV-positive Americans cycle
through prison or jail each year. 288 But few HCV-infected
prisoners are receiving treatment due to the high drug
285 For example, the McCarran-Ferguson Act establishes the presumption that
the "business of insurance" is to be regulated at he state-level unless
Congress explicitly authorizes federal action. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2012).
286 769 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The plaintiffs theory was that the
examination of the passports involved an infringing "use" of a product made
by a patented process, under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g).
287 Id. at 1362. A similar comparison may be drawn with Advanced Software.
Here, even though it was not a party to any of the relevant contracts, the U.S.
Treasury was intimately involved in the banks' processes for validating
checks, including printing checks with encoded seals that required use of the
patented technology to decode. Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fed.
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 583 F.3d 1371, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
288 Josiah D. Rich et al., Responding to Hepatitis C through the Criminal Justice
System, 370 NEwENG. J. MED. 1871, 1872 (2014).
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prices.28 9 To address this issue, inmates who have been denied
HCV treatment in three different state prison systems have
filed suit in federal court, alleging that the states are violating
the Eighth Amendment in their deliberate indifference towards
inmates' medical needs.290 State officials might in turn argue
that their constitutional obligations to provide HCV
treatment-coupled with the practical reality of limited state
budgets-establish consent to infringe. 291 Alternatively, the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) could step in to issue express
consent. Federal law authorizes DOJ to bring its own lawsuit
289 State prisons are typically unable to secure significant discounts on
prescription drugs. See Am. Ass'n for the Study of Liver Diseases & Infectious
Diseases Soc. of Am., supra note 101. At sofosbuvir's $84,000 sticker price,
state prisons collectively would need to pay Gilead $33 billion to treat all
HCV-infected inmates. This amount is four times greater than what state
prisons currently pay in total for healthcare. Anna Maria Barry-Jester,
Eliminating Hepatitis C Means Treating Prisoners, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug.
31, 2015), https://perma.cc/CL94-3PST. Because of the high cost of treatment
relative to their healthcare budgets, most states have been forced to greatly
restrict access to treatment. Peter Loftus, New Hepatitis Drugs Vex Prisons,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2014, 5:23 PM), https://perma.cc/G9SV-VHQL; see also
Beth Scwartzappel, Why Some Prisons are Spending Millions on a Pricey
New Drug, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/8DKV-
N5E8 (highlighting California and New York's recent increases in spending
on HCV treatments for prisoners, while noting that the majority of state
prisons continue to limit treatment access).
290 Chimenti v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., No. CV 15-3333, 2016 WL
1125580 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2016); Paszko v. O'Brien, No. 1:15-cv-12298-NMG
(D. Mass. filed June 10, 2015); Ligons v. Minn. Dep't of Correction, No. 0:15-
cv-02210-PJS-BRT (D. Minn. filed May 1, 2015). Individual actions have also
been brought in at least three other instances: Abu-Jamal v. Kerestes, No.
3:15-cv-00967-RDM-KM (M.D. Penn. 2015); Harvey v. Neb. Dep't of
Correctional Services, No. 8:15-cv-00102-RJK-PRSE (D. Neb. Filed Mar. 20,
2015); Harrell v. Cal. Forensic Med. Group, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00579-KJN (E.D.
Cal. filed Mar. 21, 2015).
291 The ability of a state prison to bring an implied consent claim will, however,
depend on FDA-approval of a generic option which the state could then
procure. In addition, we caution that in Carrier Corp. v. United States, the
Court of Federal Claims declined to find that the government had authorized
infringement by a contractor in the absence of express written authorization
when non-infringing equipment was generally available and could have been
used to perform the work required. 534 F.2d 244, 247-49 (Ct. Cl. 1976). The
success of an implied authorization argument in the situation we propose
may turn on whether a court is convinced by a state prison that brand-name
HCV treatments are practically unavailable at the scale required under the
Constitution in light of real budget restraints. We recognize that this line of
argument may be subject to abuse. If accepted here, could a factory argue
that it should be shielded from liability if it infringed a patent to comply with
an environmental statute if paying royalties to use the required technologies
would have put it out of business? But we believe the state prison system
should be distinguishable. First, state prison obligations are absolute and
unavoidable: unlike a private company, a state cannot close all of its prisons
or choose to pay fines in heu of compliance. State prisons also do not control
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against state prisons to enforce the constitutional rights of
inmates, 292 and to file statements of interest in existing
litigation.293 DOJ could give state prisons explicit authorization
to procure and distribute generic HCV treatments as part of a
settlement agreement or in a statement of interest.
When consent is created by an existing legal obligation,
the presence of that legal obligation itself may also be enough
to establish the second "government use" requirement:
governmental benefit. In IRIS, for example, the court found
that the requirement that the airline check passports enhanced
border security by detecting fraudulent passports, while
reducing reliance on government resources.294 The court went
on to observe that "[w]hen the government requires private
parties to perform quasi-governmental functions, such as this
one, there can be no question that those actions are undertaken
'for the benefit of the government.'295 By that logic, enabling a
state to fulfill its constitutional obligations to provide adequate
medical treatment to prisoners should certainly be seen as
producing a governmental benefit.
It is possible that federal officials could leverage other
constitutional or statutory authorities to justify granting either
express or implied consent to private insurers as well. If
private insurers are not seen as performing "quasi-
governmental functions," however, the government would still
need to independently demonstrate to a court that any
infringement is for its benefit. The arguments supporting
governmental benefit from infringement by private insurers
may be more tenuous than those discussed for the federal
healthcare and insurance programs. Nonetheless, they still
292 42 U.S.C. § 1997(a) (2012) (permitting the U.S. Attorney General to bring a
civil action against a State or local government that, pursuant to a pattern or
practice, is subjecting incarcerated individuals "to egregious or flagrant
conditions which deprive such persons of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States causing
such persons to suffer grievous harm").
293 See 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2012) ("The Solicitor General, or any officer of the
Department of Justice, may be sent by the Attorney General to any State or
district in the United States to attend to the interests of the United States in
a suit pending in a court of the United States, or in a court of a State, or to
attend to any other interest of the United States."). For example, in 2015 the
Department of Justice filed a statement of interest in a case against the
Georgia Department of Corrections for failure to provide a transgender
prisoner with adequate care for her gender dysphoria. In its statement, DOJ
took the position that the "Eighth Amendment mandates individualized
assessment and care for gender dysphoria." Press Release, Off. Of Pub. Aff.,
Dep't of Just., Justice Department Files Brief to Address Health Care for
Prisoners Suffering from Gender Dysphoria (Apr. 3, 2015), available at
https://perma.cc/PDW7-GVVH.
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merit. The federal government's financial stake in private
spending is indirect-primarily composed of tax-funded
subsidies to certain types of private insurance296-so a court
might dismiss any financial savings that pass through to the
federal government as incidental. However, the federal
government clearly has a long-term financial interest in
reducing the number of future Medicare and Medicaid
beneficiaries that have HCV. Because the full effects of HCV
can take decades to manifest, many patients insured in the
private sector will end up on public insurance (i.e., Medicare).
The government will be left with the bill for treatment of not
only HCV, but any secondary health problems that resulted
from delayed HCV treatment as well.297 Use of § 1498 in select
circumstances would also advance the federal government's
interest in safeguarding the health of its population and
reducing the spread of infectious disease, much as the use of
electronic passports in IRIS supported the federal
government's interest in border security.298 If private and state
insurers could procure generic HCV treatments, elimination of
HCV in the United States could become a real possibility.299
B. Facilitating FDA Approval and Registration
To be sold in or imported into the United States legally,
all medicines, including generic medicines, must be approved
by the FDA. The FDA has the discretion, in some instances, to
permit importation of unapproved medicines.300 But purchasers
296 See, e.g., Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2014-2023: Reduce Tax Preferences
for Employment-Based Health Insurance, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Nov. 13, 2013),
https://perma.cc/SE6H-33PW (describing how the "federal tax system
subsidize [s] employment-based health insurance").
291 This argument would also be even stronger with respect to state prisons as a
recent study estimated that wide-scale screening and treatment in prison
settings could provide substantial health and economic benefits to the
general population over a thirty-year period. See Tianhua He et al.,
Responding to Hepatitis C through the Criminal Justice System, 164 ANNALS
OF INTERNAL MED. 84, 85 (2016).
298 IRIS Corp., 769 F.3d at 1362.
299 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Cf. Ctr. For Disease Control and
Prevention, HIVIAIDS: Prevention Benefits of HIfV Treatment (Feb. 9, 2016),
https://perma.cc/7WDB-S8HJ.
300 For example, the FDA relies on this discretion to permit individuals to import
a limited supply of medicines for personal use. See 9-2 Coverage of Personal
Importations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://perma.cc/L8CT-KXMZ (last
visited May 23, 2016). In the late 1980s, AIDS advocacy organizations
pointed to this policy to import cheaper, but unapproved versions of a drug
called pentamidine. See Gina Kolata, Group Plans to Import an AIDS Drug,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1989, https://perma.cc/R59S-DHAZ. The drug was
protected by orphan drug exclusivity and priced out of reach of many AIDS
patients in the United States. Id. A recent D.C. Circuit decision related to the
importation of unapproved lethal injection drugs identifies certain limits on
340
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undoubtedly prefer to purchase FDA-approved drugs and may
be required to do so by agency or company rules. Successful
invocation of government patent use thus implicates a second
novel legal issue: What are the mechanisms through which the
FDA can approve generic medicines intended for use under
§ 1498?301
For non-biological drugs, the FDCA establishes three
principal pathways to drug approval. 302 First, any drug
manufacturer may file a New Drug Application (NDA) to
obtain FDA permission to market its medicine.303 This route is
normally used for active ingredients or formulations never
before approved in the United States and requires companies
to prove to the agency that their drugs are both safe and
efficacious. Manufacturers must submit full reports of the
investigations they have undertaken to assess the safety and
efficacy of their drugs.304 The FDA may reject any NDA that
fails to present "substantial evidence that the drug will have
the effect it purports or is represented to have."30 5 The FDCA
defines such "substantial evidence" as "evidence consisting of
adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical
investigations." 306 The FDCA further specifies that the FDA
may approve a NDA on the basis of "data from one adequate
and well-controlled clinical investigation and confirmatory
evidence (obtained prior to or after such investigation)" 30 7 if the
FDA is satisfied that this trial proves efficacy.
However, generic drug companies usually take
advantage of a shortened, second approval pathway known as
the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA). Formalized as
part of the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, this approval pathway
permits generic manufacturers to rely on the safety and
efficacy data of the original NDA applicant (the "reference
product") to obtain FDA approval, rather than produce their
own such studies.308 ANDA applicants must only show that
the FDA's enforcement discretion, but precisely how the FDA understands
these limits is not yet clear. See Cook v. Food & Drug Admin., 733 F. 3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2013).
301 As discussed above, existing evidence of the use of § 1498 to procure generic
medicines pre-dated modern FDA regulatory law. It appears as though the
emergence of drug data exclusivity laws disrupted what was once settled
practice. See supra Part III.B.
302 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1), (b)(2), & (j) (2012).
303 Id. § 355(b)(1).
304 Id. § 355(b)(1)(A).
305 Id. § 355(d)(5).
306 Id. § 355(d).
307 Id.
308 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i).
2016
67
Brennan et al.: A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 18
their products are chemically equivalent and bioequivalent to
their reference products.
309
To achieve registration under this pathway while the
reference product is still under patent protection,310 a generic
company must certify that its product either does not infringe
the reference product's patents or that those patents are
invalid. 311 If a generic manufacturer submits such a
certification, the patent holder may challenge it through what
is known as a "Paragraph IV challenge." The Paragraph IV
challenge effects a thirty-month stay of the generic company's
ANDA application pending resolution of the dispute.3
1 2
Importantly, ANDA applicants are also forbidden from
relying on a reference product's safety and efficacy data for five
years after the reference product's NDA approval, a period
often called the "data exclusivity" period.31 3 The term lasts five
years, but generic manufacturers may submit an ANDA after
only four years if they submit the requisite patent non-
infringement or invalidity certifications described above.314
If the government seeks to provide, under § 1498, a
slight variation on an existing, effective medication, a third
approval route is available: a 505(b)(2) application. 315 This
pathway is appropriate for a new dosage form of a previously-
approved drug (e.g., solid oral dosage to transdermal patch).31
Like ANDAs, 505(b)(2) applications permit manufacturers to
rely on the studies that other NDA applicants have conducted
to obtain FDA approval.31 7 505(b)(2) applicants can also rely on
published literature to support their applications. 318 This
approval pathway cannot, however, be used for drugs that are
duplicates of existing, listed drugs.31 9 It is also subject to the
same data exclusivity provisions as ANDA applications.320
309 Id. § 355(0)(2)(A)(ii)-(v).
310 The patents the brand-name drug relies on must be listed in the FDA's
Orange Book. See Orange Book Preface, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., available at
https://perma.cc/6EYV-UFJV (last visited June 12, 2016).
311 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
312 Id. § 355(i)(5)(B)(iii).
313 Id. § 355(i)(5)(F)(ii)
314 Id.
315 Id. § 355(b)(2); see FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
APPLICATIONS COVERED BY SECTION 505(B)(2) 4 (1999), available at
https://perma.cc/X3NQ-N4XS.
316 APPLICATIONS COVERED BY SECTION 505(B)(2), supra note 315, at 4
317 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (2012).
318 See 21 C.F.R. 314.54; APPLICATIONS COVERED BY SECTION 505(B)(2), supra note
315, at 2.
319 See APPLICATIONS COVERED BY SECTION 505(B)(2), supra note 315, at 6.
320 See Small Business Assistance: Frequently Asked Questions for New Drug
Product Exclusivity, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., https://perma.cc/EWP5-SV63
(last visited June 12, 2016).
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In the § 1498 context, the appropriate route for approval
of the relevant medicines will vary depending on the
circumstances. If the generic drug the government seeks to use
is an exact copy of a registered medicine, and the five-year data
exclusivity period has lapsed, a generic drug manufacturer can
simply use the ANDA process. The generic firm will be able to
certify under Paragraph IV that its product is non-infringing
because the medicine is intended only for government use
pursuant to § 1498. Under the plain text of § 1498, any use of a
patent "by or for" the federal government only has one
available remedy: an action in the Court of Federal Claims for
reasonable compensation.321 The Federal Circuit has repeatedly
affirmed that courts may not issue injunctions that have the
effect of preventing a private entity from supplying the
government under § 1498, even in cases where the government
is not a party.322 Thus, a generic drug company should be able
to prevail quickly in any Paragraph IV challenge and register
its drug under an ANDA solely for supply under § 1498.
Similarly, if the government seeks to use a drug that is a slight
variation of a registered medicine, and data exclusivity does
not apply, the 505(b)(2) application will be the appropriate
route. Under this route, the generic drug company would
submit the same Paragraph IV certification of non-
infringement.
Nevertheless, during the data exclusivity period, the
only route for registration of either a generic drug or a slightly
modified form of an approved drug would appear to be through
the NDA pathway. This route is usually significantly more
expensive than the alternatives, and the applicant drug
company and FDA would have to be attentive to ethical
321 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2012).
322 See, e.g., Trojan, Inc. v. Shat-R-Shield, Inc., 885 F.2d 854, 856 (Fed. Cir.
1989) ("Section 1498(a) would be emasculated if a patent holder could enjoin
bidding to supply infringing products.... [A] patent owner may not use its
patent to cut the government off from sources of supply, either at the bid
stage or during performance of a government contract."); W.L. Gore &
Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding
that § 1498 "automatically" protects the government and its suppliers from
interference via injunctions. Also stating that "[t]he patentee takes his patent
from the United States subject to the government's eminent domain rights to
obtain what it needs from manufacturers and to use the same. The
government has graciously consented, in the same statute, to be sued in the
Claims Court for reasonable and entire compensation, for what would be
infringement if by a private person. The same principles apply to injunctions
which are nothing more than the giving of the aid of the courts to the
enforcement of the patentee's right to exclude."); see also Zoltek Corp. v.
United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("'[T]he right to use is a
comprehensive term and embraces within its meaning the right to put into
service any given invention."' (quoting Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1,
10 (1913)); Lipson, supra note 179, at 249.
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problems associated with replicating studies with known
results.323 Nonetheless, the FDA has displayed flexibility with
respect to what investigations it considers sufficient to meet
NDA requirements, "broadly interpreting the statutory
requirements to the extent possible where the data on a
particular drug were convincing." 324 For example, the FDA
sometimes approves NDAs on the basis of a single adequate
and well-controlled efficacy study325 and has, in some instances,
not required that trials be randomized.326 The FDA has also
approved well-known but previously unapproved drugs, such as
colchicine, on the basis of data from public studies accompanied
by limited clinical safety information.327 Similarly, if a generic
firm sought to register equivalent forms of the new HCV drugs
under an NDA, the FDA would have the discretion to
determine that appropriate studies would be of shorter
duration and smaller size because the drugs' side effects and
efficacy are already well characterized, including in the
published literature. The FDA could also opt to accept trials
323 Because of these ethical concerns, and the expense, full NDAs have long been
considered an impractical means of avoiding the consequences of data
exclusivity. But this may be case specific, and depend on the degree of
evidence the FDA is willing to accept.
324 FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PROVIDING
CLINICAL EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR HUMAN DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL
PRODUCTS 3 (1998), available at https://perma.cc/TE5T-JY4F; see also 21
C.F.R. § 314.105(c) (" [The] FDA is required to exercise its scientific judgment
to determine the kind and quantity of data and information an applicant is
required to provide for a particular drug to meet the statutory standards.").
325 See Nicholas S. Downing et al., Clinical Trial Evidence Supporting FDA
Approval of Novel Therapeutic Agents, 2005-2012, 311 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 368,
371 (2014) (finding that 37% of approvals were based on a single trial);
PROVIDING CLINICAL EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 324, at 3 (such
single studies are, generally, only accepted "in cases in which a single
multicenter study of excellent design provided highly reliable and
statistically strong evidence of an important clinical benefit, such as an effect
on survival, and a confirmatory study would have been difficult to conduct on
ethical grounds").
326 See Downing et al., supra note 325, at 372-73 (FDA "approvals can be made
without requiring costly and time-consuming randomized, double-blinded,
controlled trials, although these trials are regarded as the gold standard for
evaluation").
327 Aaron Kesselheim & Daniel Solomon, Incentives for Drug Development The
Curious Case of Colchicine, 362 N. ENG. J. MED. 2045, 2046 (2010). Colchicine
is a well-known drug, first used by the ancient Greeks to treat gout. For
years, this medicine was unapproved but prescribed in the United States. But
in 2007, URL Pharma sought FDA approval for its version of the drug
through an NDA. On the basis of one randomized, controlled trial involving
185 patients, the FDA approved this medication for the treatment of gout.
The FDA also approved this drug for a different indication: to treat familial
Mediterranean fever (FMF), a rare genetic disorder that affects 100,000
patients worldwide. The FDA approved the drug for treatment of FMF based
on previously collected data along with additional limited safety information
from the 185 patient clinical trial. Id. at 2045-46.
344
70
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 18 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol18/iss1/7
A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing
that demonstrate the generic drug is not inferior to an existing
reference product rather than make a full showing of
superiority over placebo or existing treatments.328
In the case of sofosbuvir, Gilead's term of NDA-based
data exclusivity has almost run. Generic manufacturers would
be able to file Paragraph IV challenges, seeking FDA approval
through an ANDA, in December 2017. Harvoni exclusivity does
not expire until October 2018.329 This could make it worthwhile
to try the NDA route instead, particularly because there are
ongoing trials of DAAs that might be a source of data.330 The
federal government might also explore whether an Executive
Order might bolster the case for the exercise of FDA
enforcement discretion for supply by validated and high quality
suppliers.3
31
Finally, it worth noting that § 1498 was enacted and
used for pharmaceutical products long before the current FDA
approval framework was put into place. This regulatory
framework could better facilitate government use under § 1498
with explicit amendment. For example, Congress might make
an exception to data exclusivity where ANDAs are intended
only to supply for government use under § 1498. Congress
could also clarify that the FDA has enforcement discretion or
other accelerated routes for approval with respect to drugs
produced pursuant to § 1498.
VI. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: GOVERNMENT USE OF
§ 1498 TO PROCURE GENERICS
So far, we have provided theoretical and legal
arguments for why the federal government can and should
invoke § 1498 to facilitate access to generic versions of
prescription drugs when brand-name prices result in
significant deadweight loss. This Part describes how § 1498 can
328 A non-inferiority study, simply attempts to show the tested drug is not
inferior to a known effective treatment. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: NON-INFERIORITY CLINICAL TRIALS 2 (2010),
available at https://perma.cc/5ZXC-CJW3. Non-inferiority study designs are
often used where superiority trial designs would be inappropriate due to
ethical concerns. Id. at 6. Non-inferiority trial designs may be particularly
appropriate in the § 1498 context, where the government is simply
attempting to copy a known effective treatment.
329 See supra note 258.
330 See, e.g., Reviewing DAA Efficacy Managing Patient Treatment in Online
Neighbourhoods (REDEMPTION), CLINICALTRIALS.GOV,
https://perma.ce/3Y9C-BNYX (last visited June 12, 2016).
331 See, e.g., id.; see generally Andrew Hill et al., Minimum Costs for Producing
Hepatitis C Direct-Acting Antivirals for Use in Large-Scale treatment Access
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and should be used to expand access to HCV treatment.
Specifically, we identify four possible implementation options
of varying scope and complexity. Invoked narrowly, § 1498
could immediately expand access to treatment to hundreds of
thousands of individuals with HCV, including some groups
most affected by the disease. Invoked broadly, § 1498 could
provide universal access to generic drugs and permit
elimination of HCV in the United States. The effectiveness of
our strategy will turn on the administrative and, potentially,
congressional will to cross these barriers.
There are certain steps common to all options of our
§ 1498 strategy.332 First, the government should announce legal
justification for the action and identify which drug(s) it plans to
cover. We recommend that the government choose
sofosbuvir/ledipasvir (brand name Harvoni) because, as
previously discussed, this drug appears to be the safest, most
effective, and widely prescribed treatment currently available.
It should then encourage generic companies to register their
drugs via the NDA or ANDA routes discussed above, and
encourage procurement officers for the various payors
described below to contract directly with the companies, with
the federal government assuming liability for the royalties
owed to Gilead in any ensuing litigation.
A. Option One: Providing Generic Access to Direct
Federal Purchasers
Direct federal purchasing programs, including the
Veterans Health Administration, Indian Health Service, and
Federal Bureau of Prisons, present the most straightforward
application of § 1498. The Veterans Health Administration-
which regularly handles the procurement and distribution of
drugs for itself and other direct federal purchasing programs
and which has used the provision in the past333-could solicit
bids for FDA-approved generic sofosbuvir/ledipasvir and
include authorization and consent clauses in its solicitation and
contracts with manufacturers. 334 It could also amend its
332 Efforts to scale up HCV treatment would need to be accompanied by stronger
efforts to screen people for the disease. Many people remain unaware of their
infection. See supra note 70.
333 JACOBSON, supra note 260, at 8-11 (describing the Veterans Administration's
role negotiating drug contracts for itself and other federal agencies through
the Federal Supply Schedule and national standardization contracts).
334 Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) provide that when the government
expressly authorizes and consents to use or manufacture of a patented
invention it may require a contractor to reimburse it for liability for patent
infringement. FAR 27.201-1(d). In some contracts, the contracting officer is
required to include an indemnity clause, FAR 27.201-2(c); in other cases, the
contracting officer may include an indemnity clause "if it is in the
346
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distribution contracts, as needed, to assume liability on behalf
of private parties across the supply chain.
The agency should then offer to compensate Gilead
according to the methodology discussed in Part IV.A (i.e., offer
modest or nominal compensation, such as a royalty on the
generic procurement price). If Gilead is dissatisfied with this
compensation, it could bring an administrative claim against
the applicable federal agency 335 or bring suit against the
government in the Court of Federal Claims.336 Because using
direct federal purchasing programs to provide generic HCV
medications most closely resembles existing uses of § 1498, it
should be legally uncontroversial and can be quickly
implemented. (The most time-consuming aspect would likely be
the registration of the generic products, as per the discussion
above.) Although relatively few people are covered by direct
federal purchasing programs compared to the general
Government's interest to do so." FAR 27.201-2(f). Even when an indemnity
clause is normally required, however, the relevant agency head can choose to
waive indemnity for specific U.S. patents. FAR 27.201-2(e). Thus, to the
extent that any relevant contracts for drugs fall within the scope of FAR
27.201-2(c), the relevant agency head should authorize inclusion of a Waiver
of Indemnity to protect the contractors from responsibility for damages. See
FAR 52.227-5. Cf. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings on
Present Status of Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry Before the
Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 91st Cong.
7,587 (1970) (statement of Rear Admiral. H.S. Etter, Med. Corps, U.S. Navy,
Chairman, Def. Med. Material Bd.) (noting that the Department of Defense
"assumes the full financial responsibility for patent infringement by deleting
the indemnity provisions from the solicitation where this would result in a
lower overall cost to the Government").
335 Richard J. McGrath, The Unauthorized Use of Patents by the United States
Government or its Contractors, 18 AIPLA Q. J. 349, 355-56 (1991) (providing
an in-depth discussion of administrative claims for compensation, which
must be filed with the agency and include: "(1) an allegation of infringement;
(2) a request for compensation, either expressed or implied; (3) a citation of
the patent or patents alleged to be infringed; (4) a sufficient designation of
the allegedly infringing item; and (5) a designation of at least one claim of
each patent alleged to be infringed" (citing 48 C.F.R. § 227.7004)).
336 28 U.S.C. § 1498; see McGrath, supra note 335, at 357; Matthew J. Brophy,
It's Better to Ask for Forgiveness Than Permission: How Patent Infringers Can
Invoke the Government Contractor Defense Post Hoc, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 135, 142-
43 (2012). The forum in which infringement claims are filed determines
which part of the government bears the cost of infringement. "If an
administrative claim for patent infringement relates to an ongoing contract
for procurement of an infringing item, the agency must pay the
administrative claim out of the agency's current funds." McGrath, supra note
335, at 356 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 227.7006(i)) (emphasis added). In contrast,
patent infringement claims brought in the Claims Court would be paid out of
the Department of Treasury's general Judgment Fund. See id. at 362
(describing the judgment fund); see also 31 U.S. C § 1304 (2012) (explaining
judgment fund payments and regulations).
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population,337 many of these programs serve populations that
face disproportionately high rates of HCV, including veterans,
American Indians/Alaskan Natives, and federal prisoners.338
While reliable data on the number of people with HCV by payor
is limited, and many of the numbers that do exist are widely
accepted to be underestimates,339 these three programs alone
could currently treat at least 350,000 people if the federal
government invoked § 1498 for their benefit.
340
331 Jessica C. Smith & Carla Medalia, Health Insurance Coverage in the United
States: 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 5 tbl. 5 (2015), available at
https://perma.cc/2P94-AHGA.
338 Epidemiology of Hepatitis C - Viral Hepatitis, DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF. (Dec. 9,
2013), https://perma.cc/U43M-HNEW; Julia D. Rempel & Julia Uhanova,
Hepatitis C Virus in American Indian/Alaskan Native and Aboriginal
Peoples of North America, 4 VIRUSES 3912, 3916 (2012), available at
https://perma.cc/8DNA-2REZ; Aidan K. Varan et al., Hepatitis C
Seroprevalence Among Prison Inmates Since 2001: Still High but Declining,
129 PUB. HEALTH REP. 187, 188 (2014), available at https://perma.cc/T8NW-
MA9S.
339 See, e.g., Chak et al., supra note 7, at 1090.
340 A 2013 report estimated that the number of HCV-positive individuals covered
by the VA or other military health programs was 312,000. Kathryn Fitch et
al., HEALTH CARE REFORM AND HEPATITIS C: A CONVERGENCE OF RISK AND
OPPORTUNITY, MILLIMAN INC. 8 fig. 5 (Dec. 10, 2013), available at
https://perma.cc/2J7X-JMJ5. The BOP likely accounts for more than 35,000
individuals with HCV, given its coverage of nearly 200,000 people,
STATISTICS, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS (Mar. 24, 2016), available at
https://perma.cc/8FG6-VX4R (identifying 196,144 total federal inmates), and
the HCV prevalence rate among prison inmates is estimated to be around
17.4%. Treatment of Hepatitis C in a Correctional Setting, HEPATITIS C
ONLINE, https://perma.cc/5Q4C-MAEU (last visited Mar. 31, 2016). We
acknowledge that this is a rough estimate. The December 2015 Senate
Finance Committee report on Sovaldi noted that "As of November 5, 2015,
the BOP reported that 9,216 of the system's 198,953 inmates have been
diagnosed with HCV." STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 11, at 93.
The differences in this number and our estimate is likely due in part to the
previously discussed discrepancy between the number of people infected with
HCV and the actual number of people diagnosed with HCV. Finally, the
Indian Health Service (IHS) provides healthcare to approximately 2.2 million
American Indians/Alaskan Natives. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
INDIAN HEALTH SERVS., JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS
COMMITTEES FY2016 at CJ-1 (2015), available at https://perma.cc/V282-P69V.
While nationwide prevalence rates for this population are unavailable,
applying the HCV prevalence rate for the general U.S. population-2%-
would account for another 44,000 HCV-positive individuals. See, e.g., Chak,
supra note 7, at 1097. Of course, a portion of the population has already
received treatment. As of 2015, approximately 25,000 veterans, Letter from
Carol E. Farer, Veterans Health Administration FOIA Office, to Hannah
Brennan, Public Citizen Attorney (Aug. 21, 2015) (on file with authors), and
405 federal prisoners, STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 11, at 93 tbl. 4
(for fiscal years 2014-2015), had received treatment. However, the VA has
since expanded access, based upon increased congressional appropriations
and additional price discounts. Press Release, VA Expands Hepatitis C Drug
Treatment, U.S. Dep't Veterans Aff. (Mar. 9, 2016), available at h
https://perma.cc[UAX3-3DQ9.
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B. Option Two: Expanding Generics to Medicare &
Medicaid
The federal government would need a different
approach to use § 1498 to extend generic HCV treatments to
Medicare and Medicaid enrollees than for direct federal
purchasing programs. However, we believe it is equally feasible
and it would more than double the impact of action.
With respect to Medicaid, the federal government,
operating through the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS), first would enter into a rebate agreement with
the FDA-approved generic manufacturer. This agreement sets
a national floor for the percent of sales that manufacturers
must repay to the Medicaid program and is a pre-condition for
Medicaid reimbursement of a drug. 341 In this case, this
agreement would also include an express authorization or
consent clause. Because of the complex web of third parties
subsequently involved in the procurement and distribution of
drugs-including state Medicaid agencies, managed care
organizations, wholesalers, pharmacy benefit managers, and
pharmacies342-the federal government should issue public
statements that explicitly authorize the provision of generic
sofosbuvir/le dip asvir to Medicaid beneficiaries and assume
liability for the resulting infringement. These statements could
take the form of Dear State Medicaid Director Letters and
other Informational Bulletins frequently issued by CMS.
343
In contrast to Medicaid, CMS is statutorily prohibited
from directly negotiating prices with drug manufacturers for
Medicare.344 Instead, Medicare relies on private health plans
(known as Part D plans) to both negotiate for and distribute
drugs.345 Also unlike Medicaid, where states must cover a drug
once it has been approved by the FDA and the manufacturer
has negotiated a rebate contract with the federal
341 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(a)(1) (2012).
342 See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 281.
343 See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Federal Policy Guidance,
https://perma.cc/HD3S-29MW (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
344 Medicare Part D's noninterference requirement should not pose a barrier to
our proposal. This provision states: "In order to promote competition under
this part and in carrying out this part, the Secretary--(1) may not interfere
with the negotiations between drug manufacturers and pharmacies and PDP
sponsors; and (2) may not require a particular formulary or institute a price
structure for the reimbursement of covered part D drugs." 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-
111(i) (2012). Under our proposal, Part D plans would retain both the choice
to cover or not cover generic drugs acquired under the authority of § 1498 and
the responsibility for negotiating prices for said drugs with the generic
manufacturer.
345 See U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 282.
2016 349
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government,346 Part D plans retain more flexibility over what
drugs they choose to cover.347 In light of these complications,
CMS should issue letters to FDA-approved generic
manufacturers notifying them that it will assume liability for
infringement claims related to the provision of generic
sofosbuvir/le dip asvir to Medicare beneficiaries. In addition,
CMS should amend its Part D plan contracts to include express
authorization and consent clauses and issue policy statements
encouraging Part D plans to add generic sofosbuvir/ledipasvir
to their formularies.
With these authorizations in place, Gilead's sole cause
of action would be against the federal government, rather than
the private parties involved in manufacturing and distributing
the drugs. As under Option One, the government could offer to
compensate Gilead according to the methodology discussed in
Part IV.A. However, if Gilead is dissatisfied with the
compensation award, it could (again) file an administrative
claim against CMS or bring suit in the Court of Federal
Claims.
Authorizing Medicare and Medicaid to cover generic
sofosbuvir/ledipasvir would more than double the health and
financial impact of § 1498 over that of Option One.
Combining state estimates of the number of Medicaid
enrollees with HCV (698,000)348 with researchers' predictions
for the number of (non dual) Medicare beneficiaries with HCV
in 2015 (192,790), 349 we estimate that at least 890,000
individuals infected with HCV are enrolled in either program.
The vast majority of these individuals continue to wait for
treatment.3
50
346 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(2)(A)(i) (2012) (defining "covered outpatient drugs" to
include all FDA-approved prescription drugs); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(a)(i) (2012)
(requiring manufacturers of covered outpatient drugs to enter into a rebate
agreement to receive payment under Medicaid).
341 MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT MANUAL: CHAPTER 6 - PART D DRUGS
AND FORMULARY REQUIREMENTS § 30.2.1 (2010), https://perma.cc/2J85-J277
("Formulary Categories and Classes").
348 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 11, at 82 n. 466 (698,000 is based on
data reported by forty-three states and the District of Columbia; it excludes
seven states that did not provide estimates to congressional staff).
349 Fitch, supra note 340, at 35 tbl. D-1 (assuming status quo treatment rates).
This number is likely to grow significantly in the near future given the high
HCV prevalence among Baby Boomers. For example, Fitch estimates that the
number of (non-dual) Medicare beneficiaries with HCV could increase by
anywhere between 92,000 to 209,000 lives from 2013 to 2020, depending on
screening and treatment rates. Id. at 35-38 tbls. D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4.
350 See Medicare Part D Hepatitis C Prescribing Data 2014, PROPUBLICA (Mar.
2015), available at https://perma.cc/9FRZ-7PAQ (showing the number of
Medicare beneficiaries that received sofosbuvir or sofosbuvir/ledipasvir by
month in 2014); STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 11, at 82 (reporting
that only 16,281 Medicaid enrollees received sofosbuvir/ledipasvir in 2014).
350
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C. Option Three: Covering State Correctional Facilities
In contrast to the programs described above, the federal
government plays no active role in drug purchasing or
procurement by state correctional facilities. Yet the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) of 1980 gave
DOJ power to enforce the rights of individuals incarcerated in
state and local correctional facilities. 351 The federal government
can and should rely on this authority to ensure states are
providing HCV-positive inmates with the treatment they need.
Specifically, DOJ should commence investigations into
existing allegations of Eighth Amendment violations based on
the denial of HCV treatments by state correction facilities.
352
Assuming the federal government finds "reasonable cause to
believe" that inmates are being deprived of their constitutional
rights "pursuant to a pattern or practice," the United States
may intervene in one of the existing actions,353 or, if necessary,
bring a new action.354 The United States could then give state
officials express authorization to use FDA-approved generic
sofosbuvir/ledipasvir to treat inmates with HCV as a part of or
in connection with a settlement agreement. The states party to
the settlement could then contract directly with a generic
manufacturer without fear of liability or the threat of an
injunction. More broadly, the Solicitor General or another DOJ
official could file a Statement of Interest in one of the existing
cases and take the position that the failure to provide
treatment to HCV-positive inmates constitutes an Eighth
Amendment violation. 355 Then, based on the federal
government's interest in ensuring that the conditions of
confinement in state correctional facilities comply with the
Constitution, DOJ could issue a policy statement authorizing
all state prison programs to access generic
sofosbuvir/le dip asvir.356
As of December 2014, approximately 1.35 million people
were held in state prisons.357 Assuming that number has held
steady, with an estimated 17.4% of prisoners infected with
351 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq.
352 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997a-l(a) (2012).
353 42 U.S.C. § 1997c(a)(1) (2012).
354 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a) (2012).
355 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2012).
356 Alternatively, if the federal government invokes § 1498 for federal programs,
but fails to affirmatively authorize generic use by state prisons, a state may
procure generic drugs and defend itself against any infringement claims by
arguing that consent is implied. See infra Part V.A.
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HCV, 358 more than 235,000 inmates could gain access to
treatment when such a policy goes into effect. With
approximately 600,000 individuals transitioning in and out of
state prisons each year, 359 the long-term effect would be
significantly greater.
D. Option Four Reaching the Private Sector and the
Uninsured
All three options discussed above involve using § 1498 to
benefit individuals who are receiving healthcare sponsored, in
some form, by federal or state government. Yet more than half
of the U.S. population relies on private health insurance.36
0
Indeed, private insurance was predicted to cover an estimated
823,000 HCV-positive individuals in 2015, at status quo
treatment rates.
36 1
We encourage the federal government to explore
whether its existing regulatory authority could justify invoking
§ 1498 on behalf of some or all of private health insurance
plans. Even in the absence of such authority, however, this
sector need not be left without relief. For instance, Gilead could
respond to the federal government's announcement that it
plans to invoke § 1498 as Bayer did in 2001,3G2 pre-emptively
lowering its prices to more affordable levels. Unfortunately, it
is impossible to predict whether Gilead would offer prices low
enough to ensure widespread access to treatment. It is also
unclear that Gilead would extend its discounts to sectors of the
healthcare system that would not benefit from § 1498 under
Options One, Two, and Three. Indeed, the federal government
likely will need to make trade-offs between these interests if it
pursues voluntary negotiations.
A superior version of this option is for Congress to
create a new federal program modeled, in part, on the Ryan
White HIV/AIDS Program.36 3 This program could be authorized
to purchase generic sofosbuvir/ledipasvir and distribute it to
individuals who cannot afford or otherwise access brand name
drugs. Unlike voluntary negotiations, this surely would face
numerous challenges, including strong political opposition from
the pharmaceutical industry as well as the usual barriers
inherent in the legislative process. But its benefits are two-fold:
the government need not accept higher prices to expand access,
Varan, supra note 338, at 190.
Carson, supra note 357, at fig. 4.
Smith & Medalia, supra note 337, at 5.
Fitch, supra note 340, at 35 tbl. D-1.
See supra Part 11.B, note 136 and accompanying text.
See HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., About the Ryan White HIV/AIDS
Program, https://perma.cc/M9UV-82WK (last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
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as it presumably would in a voluntary negotiation scenario,
and uninsured HCV-positive individuals could receive
treatment. While the Affordable Care Act has significantly
reduced the number of uninsured by expanding access to
Medicaid and private health insurance, more than 550,000
HCV-positive people were expected to still be uninsured in
2015.364 Thus, it is the only option that could ensure universal
access to HCV treatment and make HCV elimination a real
possibility.
VII. CONCLUSION
The costs associated with the new HCV medications
have brought a pivotal problem with our healthcare system
into stark relief: our existing innovation model invites hold-up
pricing that harms public health. But this does not have to be
the case. The government patent use power offers an important
tool to combat high drug prices - a solution that was once used,
and that can be used again without the need for Congressional
action.
Section 1498's requirement of "reasonable"
compensation provides a unique opportunity to think critically
about compensation for innovation, especially for drugs with
high social value. In line with the goals of § 1498 and patent
protection more broadly, our proposed compensation
methodology tethers patent compensation to the risk-adjusted
costs of innovation. Such compensation enables the government
to reduce the inefficiencies associated with patent monopoly.
Effectively, § 1498 can operate as a kind of ex post prize
mechanism, with all of the attendant benefits emphasized by
the prize literature. By allowing the government to set an ex
post price that it is willing to pay for innovation, § 1498 can
reduce deadweight loss and increase the efficiency of
investment in research. Government use can improve the
health of millions by increasing access to lifesaving treatments
while preserving long-term innovation incentives.
Without governmental action, the inefficiencies
associated with drug pricing will only grow, as pharmaceutical
companies increasingly price drugs based on what the market
can bear, not the cost of R&D outlays (the industry's historical
justification for its prices). 365 Use of § 1498 provides an
opportunity to re-align the price of innovation with its real
risk-adjusted cost, and thereby re-align our innovation policy
with our healthcare policy.
364 Fitch, supra note 340, at 135, tbl. D-1.
365 See Troyen Brennan & Willian Shrank, New Expensive Treatments for
Hepatitis C Infection, 312 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 593, 593 (2014).
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Accordingly, we propose that the federal government act
to ensure all HCV-positive persons enrolled in a federally-run
or sponsored program, as well as all HCV-positive inmates held
by state correctional facilities, gain access to generic HCV
medications. The government should procure generics for direct
federal purchasing programs and consent to assume liability on
behalf of manufacturers and distributors that provide drugs
under Medicare and Medicaid, as well as state prisons. To
make generics available to individuals receiving care outside of
these programs, Congress should create a Ryan White-style
program for HCV that procures and distributes generic HCV
medicine to any population that the administration is
otherwise unable to reach. The government should then
provide compensation to Gilead based on the methodology we
propose. If dissatisfied with this compensation, Gilead can
litigate reasonable compensation in the Court of Federal
Claims and then the Federal Circuit.
The HCV medications are only the first in a new line of
extremely costly specialty medications. Recent reports have
estimated that spending on specialty drugs could reach about
$400 billion by 2020.366 These trends illustrate the need for a
tool that can help government provide maximal access to
healthcare while also protecting investment in new drugs.
Fortunately, the government already possesses such a tool. It is
time that it again begins to use it.
366 SPECIALTY DRUGS AND HEALTH CARE COSTS, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 2
(Nov. 2015), available at https://perma.cc/Z2EU-LFDB.
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